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MODERN IDEALISM AS CHALLENGED BY ITS RIVALS

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PREFACE

Ever since the writer took up the study of modern Western philosophy at the University of Nanking, Nanking, China, he has been greatly interested in the rivalry between idealism and its opponents, whose points of contact and conflict with each other have led him to the basic conviction of this study that the rivalry between them underlies the whole current of modern Western philosophic thought. Though the title of this study, "Modern Idealism as Challenged by Its Rivals," sounds as though an attempt to defend idealism were implied, yet, to be sure, the work, from its outset, has been intended as a purely objective comparison of the various persisting channels of Western philosophic thought. It is nothing but an embodiment of the writer's interest in making a comparative study of different philosophical systems.

On the completion of this study, he feels it his duty to acknowledge thankfully the inspiring encouragements and kind suggestions received from Professor E. A. Burtt under whose guidance the work has been done. Likewise, he is much indebted to Professor G. H. Mead for the "Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century" offered last spring and "French Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century" in the summer, whereby the study profited considerably. The work evidently reveals how his study has been facilitated by his environment at the University of Chicago.

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Chapter I

HISTORICAL EXPOSITION OF MODERN IDEALISM TO ITS RIVALS

The history of modern Western philosophy is a panorama of the rivalry between idealism on the one side and its opponents on the other. Medieval thought of all sorts, taken together as 'scholasticism', having seen its zenith of prosperity in Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), could not but meet the miserable fate of banishment at the opening of the modern era. The Copernican revolution against the traditional astronomy transformed the world-view held by liberal-minded scholars of the age. Many an intelligent person, disgusted by the dogmatism, authoritarianism, and traditionalism of medieval thought dictated by the so-called Church Fathers, ventured to search for new standards in science as well as in theology. John Huss (1369-1415) was the first rebel against their dictatorship over human speculation of all sorts, who underwent his heroic martyrdom for free thought in 1415, when he was burnt alive owing to the lectures he had delivered at the University of Prague. Similarly, Giordano Bruno's (1548-1600) pantheistic world-view, which, resorting to ancient hylozoism, conceived of all nature as alive, cost him his life in Rome at the hands of the Inquisition. Galileo (1564-1642) was forced to recant in 1633 his insistence upon the law of falling

bodies and the motion of the planets.[1] Meanwhile, Protestantism was established under the leadership of Martin Luther (1483-1546) and John Calvin (1509-1564). "The Reformation and the scientific movement," says Whitehead, "were two aspects of the historical revolt which was the dominant movement of the later Renaissance."[2] The antagonism between the medieval and the modern modes of thought was essentially due to their incompatible difference in attitude -- between faith and reason. The post-Reformation philosophy was thus born of the revolt of reason against faith. "It adopted at the very outset," says Turner, "the Averroistic principle that what is true in theology may be false in philosophy, - a principle diametrically opposed to the thought which inspired Scholasticism. Indeed, in the first great system which appeared in the modern era, not only is philosophy divorced from theology, but mind is placed in complete antithesis to matter; for in Descartes' philosophy, the spirit of disintegration, which characterizes the modern era, is subversive not only of the work of the schoolmen but also of the best achievements of Greek speculation."[3]

Since the extinction of scholasticism, the struggle between scholasticism and its rebels has shaded into the rivalry between idealism and its opponents in modern times. Modern idealism, dating from René Descartes (1596-1650), doubtless

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1 Conger, A Course in Philosophy, p. 99.
2 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 12.
3 Turner, History of Philosophy, p. 420.

rose primarily in opposition to the medieval dogmatic attitude of speculation and to the traditional idea of obedience to authorities, too. Nevertheless, it has been charged by many of its critics that it is only the traditional philosophy on the ground that it has inherited at least the intrinsic temper of scholasticism. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), an inspiring spokesman of modern idealism, is mercilessly condemned by Francois Picavet in his "Esquisse d'une histoire générale et comparée des civilizations médiévales" as a direct offspring of the Middle Ages - quoting the Bible and proclaiming the gospel of theism, of free-will, and of another life.[1] In fact, it cannot be disputed that the sentiment of loyalty to religion, the sole scholarly virtue in the eyes of the schoolmen, has permiated the whole intellectual background of modern idealists. Likewise, syllogistic logic, which medieval thought claimed as its favorite instrument, has been repeatedly adopted by many an idealist. Above all, subjectivism, which resulted from the challenge of authority, and which tinges the metaphysics of modern philosophy, particularly finds favor in both the epistemology and metaphysics of modern idealism. Away from the medieval theological interest, Luther urged every individual to look inward to his own experience in respect to moral justification and religious salvation. Descartes, realizing that 'I think, therefore I exist', developed with himself

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1 Perrier, Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 2-3.

as being a mentality his philosophical system, around which the subsequent history of philosophy revolves.[1]

Contrary to this, science, whose history runs parallel to that of philosophy, has been indifferent to religion, has depended upon inductive empiricism for its progress, and has advanced in the objectivistic direction, under the guidance of Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon, Newton, Lamarck, Spencer, Einstein, etc., whose attention has been paid to the external phenomena and facts. Many scientists and scientific-minded thinkers, consequently, have applied scientific principles to the solution of philosophical problems, and their efforts resulted in the formulation of inductive logic and the establishment of naturalism in the previous century. The first attempt to raise science to a philosophy was made by Francis Bacon (1561-1626), who, starting from his conviction that the failure of medieval thought was due to its lack of a true method, invented inductive empiricism and advocated the use of the methods of observation and experiment with management of the data thus accumulated so as to control nature. The methods thus crudely indicated were refined greatly by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) to form part of inductive logic as against deductive or syllogistic logic to which many idealists ever appealed. The mechanistic and materialistic view of the world and life, formed by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), a contemporary

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1 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 196.

of Bacon, marked the ending of the domination of scholastic philosophy over science, whereby the domination of science over philosophy took its start. Philosophy had now to derive its impetus from the new scientific inventions and discoveries, and was held to consist primarily in the attempt to generalize the method of science, particularly in the nineteenth century, during which the achievements of science outweighed those of other human cultural efforts. For decades, naturalism, "the application of the theories of science to the problems of philosophy," enjoyed its climax of popularity, forming the strongest rival of modern idealism. At the beginning of the twentieth century naturalism tended to be discredited, and yet the decline of naturalism put modern idealism into open hostility with new rivals, namely pragmatism and realism, which have arisen in revolt against idealism during the controversies between naturalism and idealism. It was in the past that idealism was challenged by naturalism, but it is just now that idealism in its encampment is confronted with pragmatism in one direction and with realism in another.

The first phase of modern idealism, however, took the form of rationalism in its way of attaining knowledge, which appeared as a scientific effort of modern thought in revolt against medieval authoritarianism. It was an appeal to reason, adopting its method and criterion from the new scientific inquiry, so that the leading idealists in this rationalist stage were intimately connected with science and affirmed the power of reason to solve the ultimate problems concerning the

world and life. Challenging medieval dogmatism, Descartes, the first rationalist, advocated universal methodic doubt as the beginning of philosophic speculation. But his attempt to doubt his own existence affirmed the truth in the fact of his own conscious thought that lay beyond all possibility of his doubt. The existence of the doubting self could not be doubted anyway; "Cogito, ergo sum"; and reason as the most reliable mental faculty of the self could not be doubted. Having firmly established such a subjectivistic starting-point, Descartes easily derived his philosophical teachings therefrom. He held mind to be conscious of its acts and able to discriminate ideas of a mental fancy and ideas coming from outside. Mind, as a thinking substance, being known by direct intuition, matter, as an outer, extended substance, is known by inference. The idea from outside has a representative function, and as the mind is then conscious of the non-interference of the will, it can be inferred that there must be something outside which the idea represents. The existence of the self being true, those ideas which are 'clearly' and 'distinctly' perceived by the mind are true. The possession of the clear and distinct idea of a Perfect Being accordingly proves the existence of God - the ontological argument advanced by St. Anselm (1033-1109) was restated by Descartes. Likewise, the existence of nature can be argued from the clear and distinct idea of nature. Finally, the idea of a substance which needs nothing else in order to exist is clearer than that of an attribute which does need something else in order to exist; therefore

God alone is that real substance, while mind and matter are created substances which are antithetical and are substances in a relative sense. The essence of mind is thought; that of matter, extension. Both, as created substances, are dependent upon the co-operation of God for their existence and union. Hereupon Descartes advanced his teleological argument - from effect to cause - for the existance of God. Finally, his rationalism led to his subjectivistic conception of the secondary qualities, such as taste, smell, color, etc., of material things as only modes of mental activity - the conception which paved the way for Berkeley to reduce both the primary and the secondary qualities to the mental states of the perceiver.

Descartes' logic is apparently deductive and mathematical. The physico-psychical parallelism of his metaphysics, which he formulated in support of his theism, reenforces his dualistic epistemology - partly objectivistic and partly subjectivistic. His whole rationalistic methodology was continued by subsequent idealists, such as Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677), Gottfried Welhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), A. G. Baumgarten (1714-1762).

The mathematical method of Spinoza is more technical than that of Descartes. In his "Ethica" he started with definitions and axioms and proceeded by way of geometrical steps to the formulation of propositions. All substance is one. Mind and matter, or thought and extension, are one and the same, both belonging in the infinite substance, which is God. Individual things are modes or subordinate characteristics of

God. Hence, the only way of salvation of the individual self is to strive for knowledge of the essence of God; and ideas are true in so far as they are referred to God. Spinoza has been influential as a classical expression of pantheism and also as one of the great sources from which the post-Kantian thinkers have derived their absolute idealism. Unlike Spinoza, Leibnitz endeavored to reconcile thought and extension, the conscious and the mechanical, in proclaiming his "monadology." Monads, or "centers of force," which are partly material and partly immaterial, compose the reality of the world. They do not interact with one another but owe their relations to a "pre-established harmony" which has been established between them by God, the highest monad as conceived of by Leibnitz. The life of each monad is active and essentially spiritualistic. But the monads in the lower scale are unconscious and constituted by confused thought. In epistemology Leibnitz went to the extreme of rationalist subjectivism (in contrast with Berkeley's empirical subjectivism) and in his "New Essays on the Human Understanding" he attempted to rebut Locke's denial of innate ideas with the assertion that all our knowledge developed from germs of thought which were essentially innate.

Reasoning from universal principles and axioms came to be, however, too abstract to combat the testimony of authorities. The rise of questions as to the origin and sanction of those abstract, metaphysical principles that had been employed at pleasure called for an urgent necessity of formulating a

theory of knowledge precedent to metaphysics. Eventually rationalism tended to be undermined. It was John Locke (1632-1704), father of empiricism as against rationalism, who first instituted in his "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" an inquiry into the origin, certainty and extent of knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent. Like Descartes, Locke developed the theory of representative perception; but instead of reasoning he appealed to sensory experience for the primary source of knowledge. Accordingly his denial of the existence of any innate ideas formed the starting point of his whole philosophic speculation. The empiricism of Locke, and of the later empirical idealists, was doomed to be not a thorough-going one but only empirical in the narrow, epistemological sense. From his fundamental affirmation that all knowledge comes from sensory experience he derived almost all his philosophical teachings in the syllogistic way - the same way in which the rationalists had formulated their systems. He conceived of mind not as a beam of light illuminating the external world, but as a photographic plate upon which objects were represented. The external world is mirrored in our ideas, which are "representatives" or "copies" of outside objects. What the mind perceives is these ideas, and through the mediation of them the external objects can be said in the ordinary sense to be perceived by the mind. The external objects are causes and ideas are their effects upon the perceiving mind. In this connection Locke formulated a theory of the interaction of mind and body, which maintains

that ideas are produced in the mind by the effects produced in the brain by the external stimuli. Since each idea ought to possess a representative function or objective reference, an idea can be true only if there corresponds to it an object in the real world. Thus Locke inaugurated the so-called "copy" theory or "correspondence" theory of truth, which had been rejected by the subsequent idealists but exercised much influence upon the naturalists and realists. He distinguished sharply between the simple ideas and the complex ideas. The former are furnished to the mind by sensation and reflection while the understanding remains entirely passive; the latter are made by the understanding which, once stored with the simple ideas, has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them.[1] The external objects, according to Locke, possess five primary qualities, solidity, figure, extension, and either rest or motion, which altogether he considered as objectively existent and independent of the mind; and in addition to these, they possess certain secondary qualities, or, as Locke says, states of consciousness. These qualities, primary and secondary, or objective and subjective, are the conditions under which our knowledge arises. Though Locke obviously subjectified the secondary qualities and considered the complex ideas as made by the understanding, yet he could trust simple ideas only. He defined knowledge as "nothing but the perception of the

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1 Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, chap. ii, 2.

connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas."[1] Complex ideas, made by the mind, must differ in the degree of trustworthiness. Hence, we have three sorts of knowledge - the knowledge of our own existence by intuition, of the existence of a God by reason (namely, by demonstration), and of any objects present to us by sensation.[2] For the existence of God Locke advanced a cosmological argument, which was quite different from that of Descartes. The rationalistic Descartes sought to establish existence first in the case of God, whereas the epistemological empiricism of Locke led to his establishment of existence first in the case of nature or the outer physical world in arguing that, as nothing could not produce a being, there must be something eternal which was most powerful aand knowing and therefore God.[3]

Father of empiricism as has been praised, John Locke built up his philosophical system only around those dominant factors - deduction, physico-psychical parallelism, dualism, and theism - which had characterized the systems of the rationalists. His starting point alone differed from theirs, which was essentially due to his initiating the effort to solve the metaphysical problems by means of a definite theory of knowledge. Consequently he could not but mould his metaphysics out of his epistemology, and the subsequent idealists

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1 Op. cit., Book IV, chap. i, 2.
2 Op. cit., Book IV, chap. xi, 1.
3 Ibid., chap. x, 2-5.

under his inspiration have had no intention of emancipating metaphysics from epistemology.

The immediate successor of Locke was George Berkeley (1685-1753), whose philosophic thought displayed the perfect maturity of the dominant factors of modern idealism. The refutation of Hobbes' materialism, of the atheism of the current naturalists, and of the dualism of Descartes and Locke, was his primary aim. No wonder Bishop Berkeley developed his philosophical principles around his theological motif. He wrote his "Principles of Human Knowledge" on purpose "'to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God, the immortality of the soul, the reconciliation of God's foreknowledge and the freedom of man; and by showing the emptiness and falsehood of several parts of the speculative sciences, to induce men to the study of religion and things useful.'"[1] At the first step, he reasoned away all the primary qualities of the external objects, resorting to empiricism; and conceived of them as mere phenomena dependent upon the cognitive consciousness of the perceiver. That is to say, he subjectified the primary qualities as well as the secondary qualities, and denied the existence of matter. He then proceeded to the formulation of his epoch-making dictum "Esse est percipi." Things, in order to exist, must be perceived by some mind; and their essences of existence are just those collections of sense-data. Mind and these sense-data alone exist. Human spirits

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1 Quoted by Hoernlé in his Idealism as a Philosophy, p. 85.

manifest themselves to one another through the collections of sense-data from their physical bodies. Reality is perfectly spiritual but cannot be monistic. The universe is merely a society of spirits or minds. The external phenomena which no human mind perceives exist in so far as they are perceived by God - the highest spirit, to which Berkeley assigned the central position. Mind or spirit was conceived of as "act" in distinction from "object." "I have," he writes, "some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words."[1] God is known by inference from the nature of the inclusive collection of sense-data. His existence is intimately present to our minds since the objects of our perception are the effects He produces in our minds.[2] Finally he contended that the act of knowledge in the individual mind implied the existence of God and was sufficient to prove His existence.

The position of Berkeley is of extraordinary significance in modern idealism. His theistic metaphysics was an idealistic attempt at the reduction of nature to spirit. His immaterialism, together with his pure spiritualism, affirmed the so-called "coherence" theory of truth which advocated the identity of idea and fact with mind itself. All the later idealists have been driven to restate the cardinal principles laid down by Bishop Berkeley - namely, the assertion of the

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1 Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, p. 142.
2 Hoernlé, Idealism as a Philosophy, p. 123.

priority of the cognitive consciousness and that of the dependence of being on the knowing of it.[1] This being the case, the rivals of modern idealism have striven to demolish Berkeley once for all with a view to deal the death-blow to all modern idealism whatever.

The empiricism of Locke and Berkeley in the long run led to the scepticism of David Hume (1711-1776). Starting from the analysis of the mind, Hume became opposed to Berkeley's distinction between "act" and "idea" or "object." Mind, if it possesses any substantiality at all, must be able to perceive itself as well as its objects. Nevertheless, when it is perceiving what perceives the object, it must perceive the perceiver of what perceives the object; and so it goes ad infinitum. Thereupon Hume denied the substantiality of the mind and cancelled the "act" as in distinction from its objects, leaving in the sphere of consciousness a flux or bundle of ever-changing sense-impressions, memory-images, feelings. The contents of mind constitute mind. They are perceptions, which are either distinct sensual perceptions called "impressions" or faint images and copies of impressions called "thoughts" or "ideas." His reduction of mind to a bundle of impressions in this manner finally obliged him to advocate a pan-phenomenalism in his psychological epistemology. Sceptical of the structure of mind, Hume came to maintain that human

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1 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 114.

reason was too weak in its scope and our mental faculties too fallible to solve the metaphysical problems. Because in his eyes no valid principle could justify metaphysical speculation about the world beyond our experience which contained no permanent, immutable element. For him, all reasonings were founded on custom.[1] The knowledge of causality is not attained by reasoning a priori; the nexus between cause and effect is not ontological but psychological - an expectation due to mental habit. Hume advocated the necessity of belief in a personal God with the assertion that the order of the universe conveyed the impression of a mind like our own, although we could have no idea of God any more than of force.[2] This does not amount to any teleological argument for the existence of God. The belief in God, according to Hume, is not the result of speculative reasoning, but rests on man's emotional and impulsive nature. Religion may be a form of revelation but not knowledge at all. The inductively empirical nature of Hume's theism has influenced the subsequent empirical conception of God as found in that of John Stuart Mill. Yet the total subversion of what is necessary and universal awoke Kant from his "dogmatic slumber" and caused the rise of the reactionary movement in Scotland among the various common sense realists.

Immanuel Kant attempted at a complete synthesis of all

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1 Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge's edition, p. 184.
2 Op. cit., p. 633.

the channels of current thought. In his youth he was trained in the rationalistic atmosphere created by Wolff and Baumgarten, but in his social environment he never failed to observe how Rousseau's emphasis on the emotional aspect of life was influential among many German writers of the period, such as Lessing and Herder. Moreover, his interest was always saturated with science, especially with mathematics, astronomy, and physics, and with theology as well. Above all, he seriously reacted upon Hume's scepticism and Berkeley's empiricism. Notwithstanding the fact that he took a fresh start in mediating between rationalism and empiricism, between dogmatism and scepticism, between intellectualism and emotionalism, and between science and religion, Kant's genius was initiative rather than eclectic. Though he seriously criticized Hume's position, yet he honestly confessed as a matter of course that the suggestion of Hume gave his investigations in the field of speculation a new direction.[1] "I first tried," says Kant, "whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connexion of cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the understanding thinks the connexion of things a priori, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such connexions. I sought to ascertain their number, and when I had satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded

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1 Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, Carus's edition, p. 7.

to the deduction of these concepts, which I was now certain were not deduced from experience, as Hume had apprehended, but sprang from the pure understanding."[1] Beyond Berkeley's empirical idealism, Kant advanced his "transcendental idealism" by subjectifying the forms as well as the contents of phenomena, the laws as well as the facts of the phenomenal world. At first he subjectified space and time, then the forms of understanding or what he called "categories," and finally the laws of nature.[2] In subjectifying space and time, Kant resorted to the possibility of the mathematical knowledge which is wholly concerned with the two a priori modes of perception free from the bondage of experience. Things ever coming to us must conform to space and time; but these two forms of our sensibility and perception need not conform to any a priori facts of experience. In the cognitive aspect of mental activity, Kant held that "to know is to judge," "to judge is to synthesize," and the act of synthesis implies a principle of synthesis, namely, that of a transcendental unity of apperception.[3] The conditions, upon which the form, structure, organization, of our experience depends, are a priori conditions, which Kant called "categories." These categories are the forms of the synthetic act of the mind, all being derived from and drawn towards the centripetal faculty of it - the transcen-

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1 Ibid.
2 v. Montague, The Ways of Knowing, p. 275ff.
3 v. Hoernlé, Idealism as a Philosophy, p. 183ff.

dental unity of apperception. Mind can apprehend the phenomenal world only by means of the categories, and so in function it seemed to Kant nothing but the synthetic or transcendental unity of apperception. Therefrom Kant obviously substituted "judgment" for "perception" and "logical mind" or "cognitive process" for "psychological mind" upon which Berkeley had set up his subjectivistic epistemology. The coherence-theory of truth was now based by Kant on the assertive character and the synthetic activity of judgment.[1] The true self is this logical mind with its necessary forms of apperception universally present in the individual in order to predetermine the unity of all phenomena. From this followed his conception of the self as "legislator of nature" in the process of synthesizing its own sensations by the two forms of perception, the twelve categories of understanding, and the three transcendental ideas of pure reason,[2] namely, the psychological, the cosmological, and the theological ideas. The mind, though so greatly empowered, is totally confined to its a priori principles, possessing no ultimate freedom in the apprehension of the phenomenal world, beyond which, according to Kant, our knowledge cannot extend. The noumenal world or the world of "things-in-themselves" remains unknown in eternity. God, freedom, and immortality are noumenal rather than phenomenal and

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1 Ibid., p. 192.
2 Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, Carus's edition, p. 91ff.

are postulates of the moral life. The traditional arguments for the existence of God were proved to be inadequate by Kant; yet he maintained that the inability of proving His existence never presupposed the possibility of disproving Him; and the final resort for this assumption was the possibility that there might exist a noumenal world.

The initiating effort of Kant made his position unique in the history of modern philosophy. His methodology is critical throughout, and he had to remain realistic in assuming the existence of the world of "things-in-themselves" and in endowing the phenomenal world with objectivity by attributing to mind the power of perceiving its laws. Yet in the hands of Kant ontology and epistemology became intimately correlated in a circular process. The recognition of the "things-in-themselves," which is an essential part of his ontology, sets limits to knowledge. Though he intended to place his epistemology upon an independent basis - the central idea of the transcendental unity of apperception, - he could not break the ontological chains in the assertion that the processes by which knowledge was formed were real facts. Thus, to reach his epistemology, as Royce says, we have to accept his ontology, while the epistemology being once accepted we are eventually led to the ontology.[1]

No matter how successfully and skillfully he could synthesize the current channels of thought, in his own philosophy

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1 Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism, p. 61.

Kant failed to complete the synthesis of the ultimate reality - between the noumenal and the phenomenal, between thought and sensation, between the realm of freedom and that of necessity, etc., - so that all post-Kantian speculation was directed towards the solution of the various problems he had bequeathed. The immediate successors of the great thinker, under the leadership of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, were to synthesize the antinomies Kant had pointed out, to reconstruct a universal system of metaphysics on the critical foundation laid by him, and to remove the inconsistencies introduced by the assumption of the "things-in-themselves." In the course of developing their systems, they subjectified the ground of our sensations, the world of the "things-in-themselves," and finally reduced all the transcendental selves to one absolute self. Under the auspices of the "synthetic unity of apperception," they attempted to prove that the transcendental selves in us, finite beings, are identical in the cognitive processes and are therefore segments of one all-embracing absolute self and that this single universal self or spiritual activity alone is the ground of all existence and cause of all experience. Consequently, we find the culmination of such a solipsism in Hegel's absolute idealism.

In the intellectualistic methodology of the post-Kantian idealists the so-called dialectic method played an exclusively important role. It was a system of reasoning in which every problem created a new one; or a schema of three stages,

wherein thesis was followed by antithesis, and antithesis by the synthesis which included both. Such an intellectual attempt was in fact a direct reaction to Kant's doctrine of antinomies;[1] and the system arose from the metaphysical transformation of Kant's transcendental logic.[2] An idea which was synthesis of antithetical aspects was now held to be true, since truth never ignored but only unified oppositions. Naturally the dialectic way of reasoning was considered as most efficient, whereby Kant's assumption of the noumenal world could be refuted.

Fichte (1762-1814), being the immediate disciple of Kant, was the first modern idealist who employed this procedure in disintegrating the conception of the "thing-in-itself" and completed the synthesis by merging the "thing-in-itself" or object or "not-self" and the "self" together in the activity of the absolute self. From the moral and rational will of Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason" followed his ethical approach to reality. The "self," according to Fichte, presupposes the "not-self," and by this act establishes a check to the individual "self"; life is a continuous struggle with the "not-self" for the ultimate synthesis in the absolute self which can be attained only through moral strife. The practical reason is thus supreme in Fichte's whole philosophy but he failed to apply the same dialectic method to other branches of thought.

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1 Op. cit., p. 80.
2 Windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 591.

For Schelling (1775-1854), Fichte had passed the treatment of nature too easily, so that he attempted to supplement Fichte's system with a philosophy of nature which pleased the then natural scientists as well as the romanticists. He started from an aesthetical approach, which had been apparently inspired by Kant's effort to refine the conception of beauty, to reality. Consequently in his philosophy the real and the ideal, the rational and the imaginative, were give equal play. For him the dialectic process is objectively present in nature as well as subjectively in mind or the self. Seeing an unity of mutually opposed tendencies in every natural object, Schelling concluded that "everything in objective nature (which is unconscious) has the same essential form as also appears in the life of the conscious self."[1] Nature and mind are therefore different stages in the evolution of the absolute self, the highest goal of which is self-consciousness, and the highest objective expression of which is in art. The absolute, defined as "the identity of the real and the ideal," is the common ground wherefrom both nature and mind or spirit are derived.[2]

Opposed to Schelling's conception of nature and spirit as proceeding from the absolute, Hegel (1770-1831) maintained that the absolute was an infinite of activity becoming successively nature and spirit rather than of undifferentiated

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1 Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism, p. 102.
2 Windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 608.

plenitude.[1] Furnished with the "universal and necessary" principles by Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," he started from a logical approach. He employed the dialectic method more systematically and elaborately than Fichte and more consciously and explicitly than Schelling did. The absolute, according to Hegel, is the only reality or ground of spiritual, rational activity, as manifested in the different forms of our experience; or in other words it is the all-inclusive totality or synthesis of different experiences. Reality cannot lie beyond experience accordingly; it is identical with thought or knowledge. "What is rational is real," says Hegel, "and what is real is rational" - this formed the central conviction of his metaphysical inquiry for which he acknowledged his indebtedness to Plato.[2] No doubt, Berkeley's "perception" was substituted with his "rationalization"; and "to be" must be "to be rationalized."

All these post-Kantian idealists of the Romantic period could not avoid partaking some characteristic defects of the Romantic writers, namely waywardness, fantasy, unwise imaginativeness, indifference to science, and regardlessness of the limits of human knowledge, as Royce points out.[3] Hegel's weakness was particularly due to the last two defects - indifference to science and regardlessness of the limits of hu-

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1 Turner, History of Philosophy, p. 562.
2 Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Dyde's translation, Preface, p. xxvii.
3 Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 168.

man knowledge. Modern idealism, at the climax of Hegelian "radical" intellectualism, became not only incompatible with science but also not completely reconcilable with religion. Hegel claimed to apprehend God by reasoning, but the resultant paradox arose from his identification of religion and philosophy, whereby no room was left for "faith." Theism being merged in absolutism, after the master's death the "left" Hegelians headed by L. Feuerbach (1804-1872) interpreted him in an antitheological sense while the "right" in the English-speaking countries regarded him as champion of theism.[1]

The post-Kantian German idealism, with its culmination in Hegel's absolutism, came to meet almost the same fate as scholasticism did centuries before. Among the idealists as well as among the naturalists it provoked oppositions together with the fermentation of pragmatism and realism. The idealists split into factions under the same roof while their opponents sprang to their feet in response to the challenge of Hegelianism. On the same German soil, Schopenhauer (1788-1860), a contemporary idealist of Hegel as he was, set up his banner of independence, and his irrationalistic voluntarism coupled with his pessimistic view of life, which was later developed and modified by Hartmann (1842-1906), vividly reflected the sentiment of the age grown weary of life and surfeited with rationalism and intellectualism.[2] Likewise, the rise of neo-Kantianism implied the revival of criticism among part of the

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1 Conger, A Course in Philosophy, p. 125.
2 Turner, History of Philosophy, p. 591.

leading thinkers. For decades, thanks to Victor Cousin's (1792-1867) interest in German idealism, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, could find popularity and sympathy among a number of French thinkers, until finally a spiritualistic eclecticism was established.[1] Their influence has been felt in the work of such writers as Renouvier, Taine, and Bergson, but immediately after they became known in France positivism rose in revolt against them and condemned all metaphysics.

By a group of literary men, interested in romantic literature, such as Coleridge (1772-1834), Wordsworth (1770-1850), and Carlyle (1795-1881), and later by philosophers like Green (1836-1882), Bradley (1846-1924), and Bosanquet (1848-1923), German idealism was introduced into England. Especially Carlyle and Green preached Hegelianism primarily on purpose to combat utilitarianism which had challenged Kantian ethics. The new Hegelianism started by them has been intended as a restoration of the prestige of Hegelianism by means of a new proof and harmonization of absolutism with empiricism, yet their philosophic thought has been dictated by the dialectic technique even in the system of Josiah Royce (1855-1916) who had laboriously attempted to harmonize the imported German absolutism to the situation created by American individualism. Realizing that the general adverse condition can hardly be changed by the new Hegelians, many other contemporary idealists

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1 Boas, French Philosophies of the Romantic Period, p. 253.

in reaction to science and rivals of idealism, have built upon a new footing their philosophical systems, and are marching from different forts against their opponents.

Thus far it has been made clear and comprehensible why modern idealism was bound to be challenged in spite of the never-to-be-forgotton role it played in the anti-scholastic movement at the beginning of the modern era. It has historically developed around three basic factors - loyalty to religion, preference for deductive reasoning, and subjectivistic encroachment on the objective world - which were derived from the legacy of medieval thought. We are thereby assured that modern Western philosophical systems are either friends or enemies of idealism. We dare to say that the rivalry between idealism and its opponents certainly underlies the whole current of modern Western philosophic thought. The main issues of their controversy being limited to those concerned with methodology, metaphysics, and the relationship between methodology and metaphysics, the analytical exposition of the points of conflict and contact between idealism and its opponents is only an attempt at a comparative study of present Western philosophical systems, to which the following chapters are devoted.

Chapter II

NATURALISM VERSUS IDEALISM

In tracing the historical development of modern idealism, we have passed its turning-point in Hegelian "radical" intellectualism. Kant's "critical" and "transcendental" idealism was transformed in the hands of his immediate successors into "absolute" idealism, an extreme form of solipsism, which looked exclusively towards the inner, spiritual facts of thought and experience, neglecting what happens in the external world existing independently of the scientist's mind, and ignoring the fruits of scientific work. The obvious demand for supplementation in current thought was met by "the application of the theories of science to the problems of philosophy" or naturalism which had derived its unusual prestige from the triumphs of science in the conquest of nature. The results of all scientific researches were regarded by a group of thinkers as the only final and reliable sources of knowledge, and no room was left for any knowledge, extra-scientific or speculative. The philosophical assertions which they made about science differed from one another, and yet they were all agreed in the systematization of the logical consequences following from the laws and principles of science. All the three forms of naturalism - materialism, positivism, and evolutionism - took their starts unanimously as sciences

in the role of philosophy.[1]

Naturalism arose in opposition to the metaphysics of idealism. As to methodology, many a naturalistic thinker adopted exactly the same methods as some idealists did, although they finally arrived at entirely different conclusions. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), father of modern naturalism as we may call him, in formulating his system of materialism, appealed to reason and employed the mathematical or deductive method as did the idealists. In order to treat everything mathematically and deductively, he tried to reduce the cause of every event to motion, and derived his philosophical teachings from his conviction that philosophy as the reasoned knowledge of effects from causes and causes from effects was just the doctrine of the motion of bodies. Naturalism, in general, had developed under the auspices of mathematics, astronomy, and physics, and so considered reality as a system of moving bodies governed by mathematical and mechanical laws, until, towards the second half of the nineteenth century when stimulated by the physical law of the conservation of energy, the chemical law of the conservation of matter, and the doctrine of organic evolution, it came to consider reality as constituted by matter, energy, or force.

The extreme "left" Hegelians, who held to atheism owing to their anti-theological interpretation of the master, even-

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1 v. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 46.

tually affiliated themselves with the materialists; while many naturalists associated the doctrine of cosmic evolution with the metaphysics which the post-Kantian idealists had moulded from the dialectic technique. Consequently, there resulted from Hegel's dialectic way of reasoning, particularly from his historical process of development, the economic interpretation of history and the materialistic view of the basis of human community which Karl Marx (1818-1883) and F. Lassalle (1825-1864) promulgated in the then social circumstances precipitated by the Industrial Revolution. Thus, the founders of socialism were not anti-Hegelian, though they derived their basic principles from materialism. The anti-Hegelian or better the anti-idealistic movement in Germany was led by another group of materialists, such as Karl Vogt (1817-1895), H. Czolbe (1819-1873), L. Büchner (1824-1899), etc., who spared no effort in protesting against the metaphysics of the idealists.

As against spiritualism or the ontology of the idealists, the materialists shifted their theory of reality from the field of "matter" to that of "energy." In the naive stage, the materialists considered the ultimate reality of nature as constituted by matter or material elements only; then they considered mind as the function of matter; later both matter and mind came to be taken as manifestations of a monistic principle which was material; and finally the material principle became force or energy which again might func-

tion as mind.[1] Thus, Büchner attributed the false philosophy of the past, by which he evidently meant idealism, to the abstract separation of matter and force. For him either one without the other means nothing. Matter is manifested in force, and force in turn is manifested in various determinate and measurable changes such as motion and heat. What we called spontaneous generation in organisms is, according to Büchner, due to the mere interplay of the physical and chemical forces of matter. "'Psychical activity," he says, "is, and can be, nothing but a radiation through the cells of the grey substance of the brain of a motion set up by external stimuli."[2]

In contrast with Büchner's monistic materialism as a general reaction against the metaphysics of the idealists, Ernst Haeckel (1836-1919) in his "Riddle of the Universe" openly announced his adherence to the pure, unequivocal monism of Spinoza, which, according to him, maintained matter, or infinitely extended substance, and spirit (energy), or sensitive and thinking substance, to be the two fundamental attributes of the all-embracing divine essence of the world, the universal substance.[3] He undertook to prove that Spinoza's confident and consistent system would be the more remarkable when it secured the support of all those empirical bases obtained

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1 Cf. Baldwin, Fragments in Philosophy and Science, p. 43.
2 Quoted by Höffding in his History of Modern Philosophy, vol. II, p. 503.
3 Haeckel, Riddle of the Universe, p. 21.

in the second half of the nineteenth century. Like Spinoza, he conceived of reality in terms of a single "substance," and his monism of the cosmos rested upon the law of substance, under which he embraced the laws of the conservation of matter and of energy. Energy is to matter what mind is to body and what God is to the world.[1] Mind is merely the sum of those physiological functions whose elementary organs are constituted by the microscopic ganglion-cells of our brain. Likewise, consciousness is a mechanical brain-function only; and only in degree of complication the consciousness of man differs from that of the lower animals.[2] Quoting Bruno's saying, "There is one spirit in all things, and no body is so small that it does not contain a part of the divine substance whereby it is animated," to support his monistic pantheism, Haeckel held that God existed everywhere and that the unity of God and the world was prerequisite to the unity of spirit and nature.[3] In this manner he seemed to pride himself on the execution of the will of his testator, Spinoza, who lived almost two hundred and fifty years before.

However, Haeckel, together with other contemporary naturalists, severely attacked Immanuel Kant, a friend rather than an opponent of Spinoza. He declared that such a narrow and ultra-idealistic conception of time and space like Kant's

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1 Haeckel, Monism, pp. 4-5.
2 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
3 Ibid., p. 78.

had become a prolific source of error and that the reality of time and space was swept aside by the one-sided exaggeration of the subjective aspect of the problem of knowledge.[1] For him, Berkeley's "Esse est percipi" principle was due to the same one-sided exaggeration, and Descartes's position must be condemned too. The existence of external bodies is as real as that of the inner organs of thought, which receive the impressions of them on the sense-organs and form ideas by association of the impressions. Again, Haeckel claimed the law of substance able and competent to pave the gaps created by Kant between the noumenal and the phenomenal, between freedom and necessity, etc., to shatter the three central dogmas of the dualistic philosophy, namely God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will, and to affirm the objective reality of time and space. Since nature was known through sense-impressions by means of sense-action, or through presentations into which the impressions were combined, and of which "we are convinced that their content correspond to the knowable aspect of things,"[2] Haeckel advocated that we had better leave "the fruitless brooding over this ideal phantom (namely the assumption of the existence of the "thing-in-itself") to the 'pure metaphysician,'" and instead, as "' real physicists,'" rejoice in the immense progress made by the monistic philosophy of nature.[3] Time and space as two forms of perception

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1 Haeckel, Riddle of the Universe, p. 244ff.
2 Op. cit., p. 292.
3 Ibid., pp. 380-81.

prove the eternity and infinity of the universe. The human will, for him, has no more freedom than that of the higher animals, from whose will it differs not inkind but in degree. Finally, as to the problem of the future life, Haeckel conceived of immortality in a scientific sense as conservation of substance and held that since the cosmos as a whole was immortal there could be no immortality of the personal soul.[1]

Unlike Spinoza, Haeckel's influence has been felt among the materialists only. A step further was taken by Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-), who, denouncing any parallelism between psychical energy and physical energy, maintained that psycho-physical energies could be converted through the intermediate form of nervous energy in accordance with the law of conservation and that, accordingly, energy became the universal substance and its constancy the universal law.[2] Very recently an enthusiastic attempt has been made by Hugh Elliot (1881-) toward saving materialism from decline and meeting the challenge of idealism. He accused idealism for its absurd distinction between noumena and phenomena, between matter and mind, and for its subjectification of the external world in the consciousness of mind.[3] The three arguments he has advanced in defence of materialism clearly reflect his inheritance of the nineteenth century naturalism which he has remodeled by means of the new achievements of science. In the argu-

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1 Haeckel, Monism, pp. 50-51.
2 Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past, p. 42.
3 Elliot, Modern Science and Materialism, p. 181ff.

ment from the uniformity of law, he contends that the law of universal causation affirms that "nothing happens without a cause, and that the same causes under the same conditions always produce the same effects."[1] Next, he argues from the non-existence of purpose or denial of teleology, holding that the material origin of all purposive phenomena can be explained by the principle of natural selection which is essentially concerned with the ordinary laws of chance. Finally, he resorts to the unreality of consciousness as an entity. For him there is no qualitative difference between the simple reflex actions and the most complicated reactions evinced by the highly developed nervous system. He denies any form of existence other than those envisaged by physics and chemistry. Thus with vitalism he confronts mechanism, and endeavors to explain consciousness on a physiological basis, and yet he rejects the association of either mechanism or materialism with fatalism which, according to him, has hitherto characterised theism, especially the highly spiritualistic religions of Eastern peoples.

So much for the main points of contact and conflict between the materialists and the idealists. Let us turn to the positivist protest against idealism, which began as an intellectual movement in France in the previous century. In fact,

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1 Ibid., p. 146.

as Boas says, the rise of positivism was a philosophical summation of the early nineteenth century French culture. The rapid "change of government, the rise of industrialism in the economic scheme, of romanticism in the esthetic, of ultramontanism in the religious, and the increasing success of natural science in the purely intellectual"[1] - all these current problems - inevitably directed the attention of a group of thinkers to the study of society, in which Saint-Simon (1760-1825) led the pioneering work. Following Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte (1798-1857) assumed the reform of society as the sole ideal of his intellectual life, and aimed at the construction of a science of society. Resorting to the scientific method, he considered knowledge acquired by observation and experience alone as positive and reliable. Society now came to be studied in the same manner in which the natural scientists dealt with animals and plants, and as a result the organic conception of human society began to be held by many writers. Meanwhile, in England empiricism as a methodological attempt was revived and applied by the utilitarians, headed by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and James Mill (1773-1836), in seeking new ways for the salvation of the mass of people from their miserable environment caused by the Industrial Revolution. The motive which determined their efforts was very similar to that of the Marxian socialists, but to the establish-

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1 Boas, French Philosophies of the Romantic Period, pp. 254-55.

ment of any "International" they rather preferred the formulation of a new system of ethics as against Kant's critique of practical reason. Consequently, the interest of John Stuart Mill, son of James Mill, in the reform of society and the general welfare of mankind was greatly intensified by the positivist movement, but it remained indifferent to the socialists. Young Mill supplanted Bentham's quantitative conception of "good" with his qualitative conception, completed the system of inductive logic left in a fragmentary condition by Bacon, and carried Hume's empirical theism farther in making his strong protest against the highly deductive faith of Christian monism. But like the positivists he showed little interest in metaphysics.

The activity of Comte was confined to the inquiry into a naturalistic philosophy of history, the classification of the sciences, and the plan for social reform. His famous law of the three stages through which the human mind has passed openly challenged Hegel's dialectic process of reasoning. In the religious stage, theology, according to Comte, represents the anthropomorphic way of thinking. Next, in the philosophical stage, metaphysics appear as a transitional phase of thought, wherein fanciful thinkers make hypothetical explanations or tentative interpretations of the ultimate reality of the universe. Finally, positive knowledge is achieved in the scientific stage. Therein the laws of phenomena are sought. In this connection Comte maintained the principle of the im-

mutability of natural law and the relativity of knowledge, and in reconciling a posteriori knowledge with a priori knowledge he held that the relations of homogeneity and succession of natural phenomena, once discovered by induction, permitted the extension of knowledge to further particulars by deduction.[1] Thus positivism took its start as a scientific way of thinking rather than as a scientific account of the world, with the view of condemning all metaphysical searches for first causes, ultimate reality.

However, the positivists were not free from a metaphysics of their own; their insistence on the futility of metaphysics was supported by their affiliations with phenomenalism and materialism;[2] and some of them even went back to the panphenomenalism of the sceptic Hume, who had considered reason too weak to solve metaphysical problems. Characterized by the analytical version of scientific concepts, positivism reduces nature to a qualitative variety and change which exhibit quantitative constancy, and, to arrive at this conclusion, it demands that nature so interpreted be coincident with knowable reality, and that the priority of physical science be argued from the nature of fact or from the nature of method, namely in either of the two ways - sensationalism or experimentalism.[3]

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1 Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past, p. 47.
2 v. Boas, op. cit., p. 281.
3 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 76.

The starting-point of Ernst Mach's (1838-1916) sensationalism was not essentially different from that of Hume's as recognized by himself, but different from Comte's position in his own assertion that the psychological facts, as sources of knowledge, were at least as important as the physical facts; and he considered his own position as bordering closely on that of the representatives of the philosophy of immanence.[1] Knowledge is limited to the field of our sensations, and rests upon no a priori truths. The "thing-in-itself" is an illusion. Science for him is to describe all elements of sensation completely and explain their interconnections systematically. Hence, the impossibility of any metaphysics. Concepts and judgments are but representative symbols for collections of sensations, or briefs expressing facts. In this principle of the economy of thought, there is contained the ground of our effort for continuity in thought, namely, for the preservation of the greatest possible constancy.[2]

Mach was opposed to the identification of his view with that of Berkeley, however. The misconception, according to him, was due to the fact that his view had developed from an earlier idealistic (namely Hume's) phase. "Berkeley regards the 'elements' as conditioned by an unknowable cause external to them (namely God);" says Mach, "accordingly Kant, in order to appear as a sober realist, invents the 'thing-in-itself';

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1 Mach, Analysis of Sensations, p. 46.
2 v. ibid., p. 328.

whereas, on the view which I advocate, a dependence of the 'elements' on one another is theoretically and practically all that is required...."[1] Rather Mach chose to challenge Kant's system. "His (Kant's) critical idealism was .... the starting-point of all my critical thought;" he adds, "but it was impossible for me to retain my allegiance to it. I very soon began to gravitate again towards the views of Berkeley, which are continued .... in Kant's writings. By studying the physiology of the senses, and by reading Herbart, I then arrived at views akin to those of Hume .... To this very day I cannot help regarding Berkeley and Hume as far more logically consistent thinkers than Kant. It is not the business of a man of science to criticize or refute a philosopher like Kant, though it may be observed in passing that it would no longer be a particularly heroic achievement to show the inadequacy of Kant's philosophy as a guide to modern scientific research."[2]

The sensationalism of Karl Pearson (1857-) is not much different from that of Mach. For Pearson, there is no room left for inquiry outside the legitimate field of science; and the distinction between science and philosophy is obscure.[3] What is called the real world is partly based on stored sense-impressions.[4] Science is "essentially the contents of the mind."[5] The assumption of any noumenal world is perfectly

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1 Mach, Analysis of Sensations, pp. 361-62.
2 Ibid., pp. 267-68.
3 Pearson, Grammar of Science, p. 37.
4 Op. cit., p. 64.
5 Ibid., p. 75.

futile in the light of science. "Behind sense-impressions, and their source, the materialists place Matter; Berkeley placed God;" Kant placed 'things-in-themselves'; Schopenhauer placed the Will; and Clifford placed Mind-stuff; but Pearson condemned such presuppositions as "an unjustifiable extension of the term knowledge to apply it to something which cannot be part of the mind's contents."[1] The post-Kantians, notably Hegel and Schopenhauer, and their numerous English disciples, are held liable for their attempt at the explanation of the universe without having had even an elementary knowledge of physical science.[2]

As to experimentalism, its leading spokesman was Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), who, deeply influenced by Kant,[3] applied himself closely only to epistemological inquiry, and yet under the inspiration of the positivists formulated no metaphysics. He argued for naturalism on the ground of method, and his theory of knowledge rested on the principles of relativity and utility. Therefore he held, for instance, that the choice between the Ptolemaic and the Copernican theories was merely a matter of expediency. But, despite his laborious effort, he could not restore the prestige of positivism amidst innumerable opponents any more than he could venture to challenge them. While positivism could not put an end to Cousin's spiritualistic eclecticism, there appeared towards the end of

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1 Ibid., pp. 41f., 68f.
2 Ibid., p. 16f.
3 Benrubi, Contemporary Thought of France, p. 96ff.

the nineteenth century a group of neo-critical idealists led by C. Renouvier (1818-1903), who, proclaiming pluralism and personalism, opposed positivism as much as the traditional spiritualism.[1]

The most persisting opponent of idealism among the three forms of naturalism has been evolutionism, which in general holds that the various complex forms of nature as they exist at present have grown by gradual stages from simpler and less complex beginnings and are changing in a gradual, orderly, and progressive manner. In early Greece the biological studies of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) anticipated with clarity some of the basic aspects of the modern evolutionary view of life. In modern times the historical school founded by Montesquieu (1689-1755) employed the concept of development in explaining the origin of social and political forms. However, the application of the concept of development had been purely ideal until the opening of the nineteenth century when Lamarck (1744-1829) formulated the biological doctrine of evolution by the scientific method. Charles Darwin (1809-1882), in his "Origin of Species" first published in 1859, rejected Lamarck's theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics of parents, and instead he discovered and verified three operative factors - variation, heredity, struggle for existence, the last derived from Wallace's (1823-1913) phrase - which constituted the fundamental elements of the general principle, named

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1 Thilly, History of Philosophy, p. 511.

"natural selection," by which Darwin meant the manner in which the environment favored certain qualities so that any variation or heredity ever useful to the individual organism, however small, was more likely to be preserved. Thus "natural selection" implied nothing but "the chance survival of the fittest" for the environment. The evolutionism of Darwin, partaking of both defects and merits, has remained an "evolutionary" doctrine - "evolutionary" in the sense that it has evolved in the hands of many subsequent scientists. But the methodological contributions he made to science were remarkable, such as his comprehensive survey and observation of available data, his hypothetical formulation and verification of the evolution of species from the same origin, or his inductive achievement. Though he never claimed his evolutionism to be a philosophical system, his influence has been felt among contemporary philosophers. This is well summed by Baldwin as follows: - "Darwin gave the death-blow to uncritical vitalism in biology, to occultism in psychology, and to mysticism and formalism in philosophy. Each of these, alike progeny of the obscurantism of dogmatic thought, has in turn yielded before the conception of natural law and order embodied by Darwin in the theory of natural selection. This in turn required the radical acceptance of a genetic or dynamic view of the world."[1] In the eyes of Darwin God could no longer be Creator, of course. Thanks to his natural piety, his opposition to the dogmatic

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1 Baldwin, Darwin and the Humanities, p. 88.

conception of a providential God could not convert him into an atheist, though later in his life he turned an agnostic. Under the inspiration of his evolutionism, there was developed the so-called evolutionary ethics by Spencer and others, either through the conception of adaptation or through that of struggle, considering capacity to survive as the criterion of good.[1] The system was seriously criticised by Thomas Huxley (1825-1895), also a naturalistic philosopher, who incisively pointed out the distinction between the "cosmic process" and the "ethical process" and between the "fittest" and the "best." On the other hand, Darwinism was adopted by Marxian socialists as a justification of class struggle and by aggressive imperialists as a justification of international war and territorial aggrandizement.[2]

It was Herbert Spencer (1820-1902) who raised the doctrine of evolution to a "systematic" and "synthetic" philosophical system upon his fundamental conviction that the world was a great evolutionary process, whose materials were found in matter, and force, and that the world could be explained merely as the redistribution of these which he called the "modes of the Unknowable" as they were themselves not the ultimate realities. He therefrom interpreted all phenomena of life, mind, and society, in terms of matter, motion, and force, and formulated the doctrine of "the Persistence of Force."[3]

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1 Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past, p. 28.
2 Cf. ibid., p. 29.
3 v. Spencer, First Principles, Part II, Chapter vii.

Philosophy, by Spencer, was conceived of as completely unified knowledge, common sense knowledge as disunified, and scientific knowledge as partially unified; because philosophical knowledge consisted in "the discovery of some ultimate truths from which the axioms of mechanics, physical and psychological principles and social laws can be deduced."[1] An assumption is true and valid for him only in so far as it agrees with all other assumptions. He regarded his doctrine of evolution as a means to his philosophical research. Evolution as a transition from homogeneity to heterogeneity, from diffusion to integration, and from incoherence to coherence, he held to be the same in any case, biological, psychological, social or ethical. Hegel's dialectic is apt to be recalled to us in this connection by the so-called law of increasing organization - a synthetic law prescribing (1) evolution as concentration (or integration), (2) development as differentiation, and (3) evolution as determination. The last point of view really consists of a union or synthesis of the former two, so that evolution must necessarily lead to a doctrine of equilibrium, wherein concentration as well as differentiation will have reached its completion.

According to Spencer, knowledge, completely unified as in case of philosophy, rests on the principle of relativity. The process of thought involves relation, difference, and likeness, and thought expresses relations alone.[2] The existence

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1 Höffding, History of Modern Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 462.
2 Collins, Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy, p. 11.

of a non-relative is affirmed by such an epistemological relativism, as involved in the facts summarized by Collins:- "that all our knowledge is Relative; that the Relative is itself inconceivable, except as related to a real Non-relative; that unless a real Non-relative or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself becomes Absolute; and, finally, that the existence of a Non-relative is involved in the process of thought. Hence our indestructible belief in that actuality."[1] Herein evidently Spencer's theistic view was in contact with that of Kant. Though he maintained that Kant's view with regard to the origin of knowledge was avowedly and utterly unexperimental,[2] yet he proposed to reconcile Kant's a priori idealism with the empiricism of British idealists when he held that, in case of new experience, certain habits of thought in the individual mind reflect both the past experience and the ancestoral or racial experience, and so constitute our preformed intelligence, which might be regarded as a priori, but which is a posteriori in its ultimate origin, or in relation to the racial experience.[3] Again, he condemned the subjectification of ideas and impressions by Berkeley and Hume on concluding that "language absolutely refuses to express the idealistic and sceptical hypotheses."[4] Likewise, he was opposed to the subjectification of time and space as two forms of

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1 Op. cit., pp. 12-13.
2 Höffding, History of Modern Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 476.
3 Cf. Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past, p. 34.
4 Collins, Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy, p. 292.

cognition, which according to him, inevitably implies the isolation of both time and space from the external world, which cannot be allowed in the philosophy of cosmic evolution.[1] The universal forms of the non-ego, if any, would establish corresponding forms (which Spencer implicitly referred to the 'categories') in the ego. His own conception of time as the blank form in which the successive states of consciousness are presented and represented,[2] must have had considerable influence on Bergson's view of time.

It cannot be disputed that evolutionism has had tremendous influence upon contemporary philosophic thought. The subsequent cosmic philosophy of John Fiske (1842-1901) reflected a landmark in the triumphal tour of evolutionism in the New World. At present C. Lloyd Morgan (1852-) represents an "evolutionary" phase of the old evolutionism in holding that the world had developed through different stages or levels, such as matter, life, and mind. However, generally speaking, the success of evolutionism has been due to its methodological value while its failure, to its metaphysical inadequacy. The rising champions of modern idealism, to avenge their predecessors, have struck at this point. In his "Spirit of Modern Philosophy," Josiah Royce openly declared against Spencer in respect to the paradox created by the latter's distinction between the Knowable and the Unknowable,[3] and in

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1 Spencer, First Principles, Sect. 15.
2 Collins, Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy, p. 276.
3 Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 298.

turn he argued for absolutism from what many naturalists called "agnosticism." Most notably of all, Henry Bergson mortally demolished both Darwin's and Spencer's evolutionism, and, relying on his intellectual background saturated with biological knowledge, formulated his evolutionism of "l'élan vital" - an independent system of spiritualism that appeared early at the opening of the twentieth century.

To be sure, Bergson's attempt has been an unique, thorough-going reaction to all forms of naturalism. At the starting-point he made a distinction between a series of antinomies - between quality and quantity, intensity and magnitude, time and space, duration and extensity, freedom and determinism, etc. Then he daringly drew a clear-cut border line between the territory of science and that of philosophy. In the field of science we have to use intellect, which, according to Bergson, grasps only the quantitative, the discontinuous, the disconnected, the calculable, the homogeneous, the spacial, the mechanically determined. Thus science cannot refrain from distorting reality, whereas philosophy, in order to approach reality, appeals to intuition, which gives complete knowledge in comprehending the qualitative, the continuous, the connected, the incalculable, the heterogeneous, the purely temporal, the free life. Bergson recognized intellectualism as the sole factor that fermented the 'imperialism' of the exact sciences. Therefore he confronted intellectualism with intuitionism and attempted to drive scientific mechanism and determinism out of the philo-

sophical world. In his "Creative Evolution" he considered the mechanist theories as inadequate and incompetent to account for the real nature of evolution. Spencer's account of cosmic evolution, Darwin's principles of chance survival of the fittest and of natural selectidn, and Lamarck's principles of adaptation to environment and of inheritance of acquired characteristics, unanimously spoke on behalf of scientific determinism. They took into account only fragments of the evolved and never inquired into the eternal force that motivated the factors of evolution. Therefore Bergson traced the development of living organisms, which had developed along divergent branches of evolution, in order to show that in the divergent branches the appearance of organs of similar function but of complicated structure was caused by what he called "l'élan vital" or the vital impetus which motivated the development of living forms in imitation of the creative, upward tendency of the universe. With the doctrine of "l'élan vital" he claimed to supplant the old, mechanistic evolutionism once for all.

Such being the case, methodological success and metaphysical failure constitute the destiny which materialism, positivism, and evolutionism, have equally met in the light of current thought. In methodology naturalism, with its three forms taken as a whole, hastened the rise of neo-Kantianism or revival of criticism. Liebman's slogan "Back to Kant" proclaimed in 1865 was successively re-echoed by E. Zeller, K. Fischer, and F. A. Lange, who all emphasized the need of

epistemological investigation, and some others, affiliated with the positivists, even explicitly limited philosophy to epistemology. Meanwhile, another group of post-Hegelian idealists in Germany utilized the results of their own scientific work to defend spiritualism and develop idealism or to combat the naturalists with the same weapons used by them. Thus Lotze (1817-1881) undertook the task of reestablishing philosophy on his basic knowledge of physiology, biology, and psychology; Fechner (1801-1887) founded psycho-physics, and proclaimed a panpsychic view of the world; and Wundt (1832-1920) built his system upon the ground of his psychology, physiology, and anthropology.

At present, science is believed to submit to constant fallibility; and its theories are held to be in perpetual need of correction. Most present-day thinkers have realized that no philosophical system can be built upon the ground of any loose sand as the naturalists had done. One after another, contemporary idealists, such as Boutroux, Aliotta, Haldane, H. W. Carr, have reacted to the sciences, and above all James Ward has minutely exposed all the sciences of mechanics, biology, and psychology, to the critique of the intellectual mind. Nevertheless, naturalism as methodology has sought sympathy in many other contemporary thinkers, particularly those who have been disgusted with the methodology or with the confusion of methodology with metaphysics by the idealists. These adventurous thinkers are either "pragmatists" or "realists," who recently have opened fire at the idealists, and the

battle-lines of whose encampments it is our task to observe in the next two chapters.

Chapter III

PRAGMATISM VERSUS IDEALISM

We have noticed in the preceding chapter that, among all modern idealists, Kant, the only guarantor of the possibility of pure metaphysics, was most seriously attacked by the naturalists who arose primarily in revolt against the metaphysics of idealism. It was Kant who granted the objective existence to the noumenal world of the "things-in-themselves"; and who subjectified time and space, the forms of understanding, and the laws of nature - the subjectification of which could not be allowed by any form of naturalism at all. Therefore it was inevitably the most difficult and yet the most important task for the naturalists to strive to demolish Kant's metaphysics.

The attention of the pragmatists in general has been focussed upon their campaign against Hegel. Pragmatism arose primarily in opposition to the methodology of modern idealism, which had shifted from rationalism to empiricism, from empiricism to scepticism, from scepticism to transcendentalism, and finally from the transcendentalism of Kant to the "radical" intellectualism of Hegel. Consequently, pragmatism is a polemic against intellectualism methodologically and against absolute idealism metaphysically. "The historical significance of this," says A. W. Moore, "is that pragmatism has in fact

developed out of continued attempts to escape a number of difficulties into which it believes absolutism and intellectualism have always fallen."[1] Because of the historical relations and also of the logical relations pragmatism bears to absolutism, absolute idealism is peculiarly abhorrent to the pragmatists.

The pragmatic spirit is, in fact, a revolt against the scholastic habit of mind or what we might call the legacy of medievalism. Classic philosophies have to be revised because they must keep equal distance on each step in their advance with the various social and intellectual tendencies, such as the conquest of the sciences by the experimental method of inquiry; the injection of evolutionary ideas into the study of life and society; the application of the historic method to religions and morals as well as to institutions; and the creation of the sciences of "origins" and of the cultural development of mankind. All these factors together motivated the rise of present pragmatism. It was Francis Bacon, according to Dewey,[2] who first exemplified the newer spirit when he conceived of knowledge as power, as tested by its promotion of social progress, and as dependent upon organized cooperative research, namely accumulation of experiment or experimentation of facts. "When William James called Pragmatism a New Name for an Old Way of Thinking," says Dewey, "I do not know that

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1 Moore, Pragmatism and Its Critics, p. 23.
2 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 28ff.

he was thinking expressly of Francis Bacon, but so far as concerns the spirit and atmosphere of the pursuit of knowledge, Bacon may be taken as the prophet of a pragmatic conception of knowledge. Many misconceptions of its spirit would be avoided if his emphasis upon the social factor in both the pursuit and the end of knowledge were carefully observed."[1] Kant used the word "pragmatic" in the sense of "prudent," whereby he meant "a mode of action by which a purpose might be attained"; and he used to associate its implication with utilitarianism.[2] It is true that some of Kant's important teachings are so pragmatic in spirit that the great thinker is regarded by Marcel Hébert as a precursor of pragmatism. According to Hébert, Schiller always cites from Kant the significant affirmation as follows: "'Tout intérêt est pratique, l'intérêt même de la raison spéculative n'est que conditionnel et seulement complete dans l'usage pratique.'" "Kant," Hébert adds, "expose sa doctrine des postulate de la raison pratique, 'hypothèses'[3] dont, par elle-même s'aventurer à affirmer la possibilité, mais qu'elle ne choisit pas, toutefois, arbitrairement: elles apparaissent comme 'conditions pratiquement nécessaires' de l'accomplishment de la loi morale; la volonté les veut en même temps qu'elle veut le Bien...."[4] Likewise, Schopenhauer is counted among the precursors of pragmatism with

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1 Ibid., p. 38.
2 Carus, Truth on Trial, pp. 4, 120-21.
4 Hébert, La Pragmatisme, pp. 67-68.
3 Namely, God, freedom and immortality.

regard to his voluntarism according to which intelligence is an instrument in redeeming the will and possesses a real value by itself when it frees itself from the tyranny of the said will.[1]

The term "pragmatism" is derived from a Greek origin and was first introduced into philosophy by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) in 1878, when he proposed in the "Popular Science Monthly," January, 1878, a new method for making our ideas clear, which prescribed that the meaning of an idea consisted in the actual or possible effects it might produce. Thus the new method made no distinction between belief and meaning. William James (1842-1910) adopted the word as "a Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking" and used its implication as test of the meaning and worth of specifically philosophic conceptions. Evidently "pragmatism" was born a method of judgment, an attitude of evaluation, and a way of thinking. It is empirical in spirit and emphasizes concreteness and adequacy and always takes facts, effects, and action into serious account; it is opposed to dogma, and to the pretence of finality in truth; and yet it does not stand for any special results.[2]

F. C. S. Schiller (1864-) concludes that all knowledge is purposive or teleological. This view James adopted as part of the pragmatic conception. Since truth is the goal in which knowledge proper terminates, it follows that truth

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1 Hébert, op. cit., p. 69.
2 James, Pragmatism, p. 51.

is something which flows upon our intelligent activities and produced by them. As truth involves the relation of objects to thought, this making of truth logically implies a making of reality. Accordingly, pragmatism was extended from a theory of the purposive character of knowledge and a theory of truth as the successful working out of knowledge to the ontological theory that reality itself is plastic and is in course of construction through the cognitive efforts of man. Schiller calls this aspect of pragmatism "humanism"; and in many aspects he is agreed with idealists epistemologically, and particularly with the personal idealists as indicated by his contribution to personal idealism in his "Axioms as Postulates" in Personal Idealism.

John Dewey (1859-), following James' psychological suggestion that intelligence evolved as an instrument of adaptive response to stimuli, developed psychologically the idea that thinking is the counterpart and complement of habit and that it is always an instrument for the accomplishment of some practical end or of making a deliberate choice between conflicting ends. This conclusion led to his logical reconstruction, through which he treated logic as a systematized account of the procedures of thinking in adapting beings living in a social environment to the control of novel and uncertain features of existence. On the moral side, the notion affirms the theory that standards and ideals are not fixed and a priori, but are in a constant process of hypothetical construction and of testing through application to the control of particular

situations. This general logical and ethical view, known specifically as "instrumentalism," was adopted by James as a part of pragmatism in its wider sense.

Since the dawn of modern times, all the changes, such as scientific inventions and discoveries and developments, and growth of religious individualism in accordance with political individualism, had effected the substitution of an idealism based on epistemology for the idealism based on the metaphysics of classic study. In breaking away from antique and medieval thought, accordingly, the early modern thought of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, continued the older tradition of a reason that created and constituted the world, but combined it with the notion that reason operated through human mind, individual or collective. The rationalists appealed to mathematics in their methodology, while the empiricists to psychology. In Kant's transcendentalism, empiricism and rationalism came together, and in identifying logic with the cognitive process of mind Kant practically drew no border line between psychology and his transcendental logic. Idealism ceased to be metaphysical and cosmic in order to become epistemological and personal. The development evidently represents a transitional stage, according to Dewey. The ancient tradition was still strong; the new system did not freely formulate the power to direct nature's forces through knowledge - that is, purposeful, experimental action to reshape beliefs and institutions. Kantianism still retained the dog-

matic rigidity of rationalism, and in teaching the a priori concepts aside from experience Kant fostered the spirit of absolutism. Reason employed by historic rationalism has tended to absolutism; and it is used as an agency of justification and apologetics. Without intellectual responsibility in assuming the conceptions of reason to be self-sufficient and unnecessary to secure any confirmation in experience, the hierarchical absolutism of Hegel was built, and in Hegelian "radical" intellectualism methodology, including psychology, logic, and epistemology, was completely amalgamated with metaphysics. Consequently, pragmatism, as a revolt against the idealist methodology, is incompatible with absolute idealism throughout. "Absolutism is other-worldly, contrary to appearances;" says Perry, "pragmatism mundane, empirical. Absolutism is mathematical and dialectical in method, establishing ultimate truths with demonstrable certainty; pragmatism is suspicious of all short-cut arguments, and holds philosophy to be no exception to the rule that all hypotheses are answerable to experience. Absolutism is monistic, deterministic, quietistic; pragmatism is pluralistic, indeterministic, melioristic. That which absolutism holds to be most significant, namely, the logical unity of the world, is for pragmatism a negligible abstraction. That which for absolutism is mere appearance - the world of space and time, the interaction of man and nature, and of man and man, is for pragmatism the quintessence of reality. The one is the philosophy of eternity, the other the philosophy

of time."[1] But on the whole, pragmatism agrees with modern idealism in the assertion of the interdependence of subject and object, and in the "presentative" theory of sense-perception; with realism in the maintenance of the particular to be real and of the objective existence of the outer world.

William James, at the outset of his philosophic career, boldly declared against Hegelianism in his "The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy" first published in 1897. The past philosophy was for him abstuse, theoretical, impractical, and dreary, so that he aimed to supplant it with a philosophy which should be friendly to common sense and concrete experience. His distinction between two types of "mental make-up," the tender-minded and the tough-minded, together with his consideration of the former as rationalistic or going by principles, intellectualistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic, and dogmatical; and of the latter as empirical or going by facts, sensationalistic, materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic, and sceptical,[2] is utterly arbitrary and meaningless in the eyes of the idealists.[3] Nevertheless, James offered pragmatism as a mediating system between the two types of thought, which should remain like the rationalisms and at the same time preserve the richest intimacy with facts, in consideration that

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1 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 198-99.
2 James, Pragmatism, pp. 11-12.
3 Sinclair, A Defence of Idealism, pp. viii, ix.

philosophies like men have characters and are liable to as summary judgments.[1] Thus, in the form of pragmatism James proposed a means of settling metaphysical disputes: whether the world is one or many, whether fated or free, whether material or spiritual. On this account he advocated the interpretation of each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences.

The various forms of pragmatism differ from one another only as to their emphasis. They, however, all agree in the conception of pragmatism as an attitude of mind in looking forward to future results, as a method of investigation in using actual or possible outcomes of our ideas to determine the real meaning of these ideas, and as a theory of truth, defining truth in terms of the capacity to produce consequences. Above all, they can best cooperate in challenging the idealist methodology - the psychology, logic, and epistemology, of modern idealists.

In the first place, with their functional psychology, the pragmatists have replaced the so-called atomic psychology of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, which considered mind as a collection of sensations, or a flux of sense-perceptions, or a bundle of impressions; and the structural psychology of Lotze, Fechner, and Wundt, which maintains that mind has distinct faculties and consciousness can be analyzed into structural elements. Medieval speculation held the individual soul to be

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1 James, op. cit., pp. 31-35.

the ultimate end and subject of salvation or damnation. Descartes and Berkeley and their followers used the words, "ego," "spirit," "mind," "consciousness," almost all in an interchangeable manner. Despite their challenge of and revolt against scholasticism, these thinkers little noted the legacy of medieval thought they exhibited and perpetuated in their protests and reforms.[1] For Berkeley and his disciples, ideas which James considers as the verbal equivalent of what he calls "experiences," are discontinuous, the content of each being wholly immanent; and between them there are no transitions with which they are consubstantial and through which their being may unite. "The incredibility of such a philosophy," says James, "is flagrant. It is 'cold, strained, and unnatural' in a supreme degree; and it may be doubted whether even Berkeley himself, who took it so religiously, really believed, when walking through the streets of London, that his spirit and the spirits of his fellow wayfarers had absolutely different towns in view."[2] Fechner's theory of consciousness holds that states of consciousness and conscious experiences can separate and combine themselves freely and keep their own identity unchanged while they are forming parts of simultaneous fields of wider scope, and that a new sensation obtained can exist separately or combine with other co-existent sensations. It is after this analogy, according to James, that absolutism explains

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1 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 224.
2 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 76, 77.

the relation of our finite minds to the eternal mind, that pantheistic idealism considers us as existing in the absolute, and that empiricism explains the composition of the human mind out of subordinate mental elements.[1] Consciousness is not composed of individual elements distributively; it is a continuum collectively just like water, as the combination of hydrogen and oxygen, is not the total sum of H, H, and O, as elliptically indicated, but is our name for the new function which the combination performs.[2] The several thoughts, each of an individual word, are not the self-same mental thing as one thought of the whole sentence.[3] Similarly, the collective experience of the all-embracing knower or absolute mind cannot be logically identical with a lot of distributive experiences that happen to the individual finite minds considered by the absolute idealists as segments of the absolute mind.[4] Hence, the absurdity of the assumption that the absolute owns finite creatures as its verbal fragments. Lotze and Wundt are scrutinized in the same way, especially by Dewey and his followers in the "Studies in Logical Theory." Consciousness, for all the pragmatists, is a functioning continuum, and so cannot be analyzed or resolved into elements or constituents. "It is precisely what it is," says B. H. Bode, "and not some product of our after-thought that we are pleased to substitute for it."[5]

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1 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 176, 177, 182.
2 Ibid., p. 186f.
3 Ibid., p. 191.
4 Ibid., p. 199.
5 Dewey and Others, Creative Intelligence, p. 231.

To support their contention that consciousness is not any separate psychic entity but function, the pragmatists clearly discriminate mind and consciousness. "Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life;" says Dewey, "consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings....The great part of mind is only implicit in any conscious act or state; the field of mind - of operative meanings - is enormously wider than that of consciousness. Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial; a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness is process, a series of heres and nows."[1] Thus, conscicusness in our daily life is but a transformation-phase of experience. The various states of consciousness are the morphology of certain functions; "knowing, willing, feeling, name states of consciousness not in terms of themselves, but in terms of acts, attitudes, found in experience."[2] Likewise, according to James, consciousness stands not for an entity but for a function, which is knowing, and for the performance of such a function consciousness acquires the quality of 'being'.[3] Consciousness is herein admitted as an 'epistemplogical' necessity. But in actual life action is primary and knowledge is secondary. The

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1 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 303.
2 Dewey, The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy and Other Essays, p. 250ff.
3 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 6.

absolutists reduce conduct to 'appearance'; while the pragmatist reaction against absolutism makes conduct primary and thought secondary. Thus, consciousness is an instrument with a survival-value which consists in its enabling the organism to learn to adapt itself to its environment. Its primary function is to modify habit, and so it has genetic and functional relations to conduct. From this follows the pragmatist distinction between fact and judgment, between the experience of a good and the judgment that something is valuable in a certain kind and amount. The pragmatist then exposes the confusion of these two distinct processes in medieval thought, the identification of any and every experience of good with a judgment or cognitive apprehension in the system of Descartes, and the conception of the emotions as organs of value judgments in Lotze's theory which Dewey condemns as a survival of the scholastic psychology of the vis aestimativa.[1]

Such being the case, the pragmatist psychology is functional, instrumental, and teleological; and the functional, instrumental, and teleological character of their logic, of their epistemology, and finally of their metaphysics, is fundamentally due to such a psychology. The interaction of organism and environment, resulting in some adaptation which secures utilization of the latter, is the primary fact, the basic category, according to Dewey.[2] Knowledge is secondary in origin, and is involved in the process by which life is sustained and evolved.

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1 Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 349-51.
2 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 87.

When the senses of an animal are affected, reaction or adaptation follows immediately but not information about something externally going on in the world. At this critical moment intelligence functions in assisting the organism to deal with its environment. Thus, intelligence develops and matures in the light of the needs and deficiencies of the present, and makes suggestions and methods for the specific reconstruction of life, which are tested by success or failure in accomplishing this task of readjustment. An idea is but a suggestion of something to be done or of a way of knowing which is not contemplative but practical. Ideals for Dewey are methods rather than goals, and his attention and interest is directed to the practical problems of philosophy, that is, ethical, social, and political, wherefore he preaches his "pragmatic idealism" in terms of an instrumentality of purposive action.

The cognitive process of mind is considered by functional psychology as essentially teleological and focussed on the attainment of ends. It is the process of scrutinizing a situation, put in Stuart's words, with a view to determining the availability for one's intended purpose of such objects and conditions as the situation may present.[1] Thinking for the pragmatists is adaptation to an end through the adjustment of particular objective contents. According to A. W. Moore, all thinking is a manifestation of conduct or action seeking to maintain and elaborate what is satisfying and valuable;

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1 Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, p. 230.

whether thinking is a part of conduct is the original issue between pragmatism and its critics.[1]

Owing to its subordination of intelligence to action and conception of knowledge as instrumental to life, pragmatism has much affinity with the thought of Henri Bergson. Besides, Bergson is quite agreed with the pragmatists in conceiving of consciousness as a continuum and of experience as a continuing or flowing stream which they liken to a personal history which is nothing but a process of change in time, the change itself being one of the things immediately experienced. Change for James is a continuous transition which is one sort of conjunctive relation. However, at this point, not to intuitionism as Bergson does, but to his "radical empiricism" James appealed. "To be a radical empiricist," says James, "means to hold fast to this conjunctive relation of all others, for this is the strategic point, the position through which, if a hole be made, all the corruptions of dialectics and all the metaphysical fictions pour into our philosophy. The holding fast to this relation means taking it at its face value, neither less nor more; and to take it at its face value means first of all to take it just as we feel it, and not to confuse ourselves with abstract talk <u>about</u> it, involving words that drive us to invent secondary conceptions in order to neutralize their suggestions and to make our actual experience again seem rationally possible."[2] Berkeley and Hume conceived of sense-

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1 Moore, <u>Pragmatism and Its Critics</u>, pp. 4, 21, 22.
2 James, <u>Essays in Radical Empiricism</u>, pp. 48-49.

perceptions as loose and separate; James Mill denied that similars had anything really in common; and J. S. Mill held that both physical things and selves were composed of discontinuous possibilities.[1] James accordingly considered radical empiricism as better affiliated with natural realism than with British empiricism. For radical empiricism, "the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be counted as 'real' as anything else in the system."[2] The general doctrine of radical empiricism is well summed up by Perry in the following words: "The parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated continuous structure."[3]

The thorough-going emphasis on continuity in dealing with the problems of consciousness and experience differentiates pragmatism from idealism not only in psychology but in logic as well. As pointed out by James,[4] it is language which cuts our sensational experiences into different names or separate conceptual entities; whereas in the continuum - consciousness - they flow like a current. The intellectualistic logic divides our mental life into separate units and causes difficulties in approaching reality. "The treating of a name as

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1 Ibid., p. 43ff.
2 Ibid., p. 42.
3 Op. cit., Editor's Preface, xii.
4 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 285.

excluding from the fact named what the name's definition fails positively to include," says James, "is what I call 'vicious intellectualism'."[1] Thinking originates from specific conflicts in experience. Inquiry, observation, and minute and extensive criticism are essential to thinking. "The habit of treating observation as something outside of and prior to thinking, and thinking as something which can go on in the head without including observation of new facts as part of itself," leads to that type of idealism which has been termed by Dewey as "intellectual somnabulism." "It creates a class of 'thinkers' who are remote from practice and hence from testing their thought by application - a socially superior and irresponsible class."[2]

Pragmatic logic, put in Schiller's words, contends "that assertions which carry no consequences, distinctions which make no difference, 'truth' which cannot be applied, truth-claims which cannot be tested, are all unmeaning."[3] The pragmatists by this way aim to supplant both deduction and induction with what we may call "conduction" which is derived from their attitude "of looking away from the first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts."[4] According to A. W. Moore, both Kant and Mill aimed to replace the

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1 Ibid., p. 60.
2 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 140.
3 Schiller, Problems of Belief, p. 141.
4 Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 54-55.

logics of sensationalism and rationalism with a "logic of things" and of "truth," so that Mill's things turned to states of consciousness, and Kant's were phenomenal; and both alike failed to establish continuity between the conduct of intelligence and other conduct.[1]

Pragmatism urges insistently the psychological treatment of logical theory, whereas Hegelianism, as Laguna says, on conceiving of psychology as aiming at a merely mechanical process, contends that psychological method is fundamentally incapable of dealing with logical problems, and so the Hegelians attempt to treat the processes of reflective thought in abstraction from their genetic and funtional relations to other human activities.[2] James, in declaring against Hegel, undertook to prove that the dialectic method with the category of negation employed by Hegel was the essence of his intellectualism which led to his absolute monism and also to those of Lotze and Royce who made proofs of the absolute by reductio ad absurdum.[3] He held that Hegel's applications of the dialectic method were unsatisfactory; that the method partly rested on the Hegelian vision or intuition and partly resided in empiricism and common sense; and that accordingly Hegel was not primarily a reasoner but really "a naively observant man, only beset with a perverse preference for the use of technical and

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1 Dewey, and Others, Creative Intelligence, pp. 92-93.
2 Laguna, Dogmatism and Evolutionism, p. 121.
3 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 104.

logical jargon," and had a very impressionistic mind.[1]

With their instrumental logic, the pragmatists confront the formal logic of the idealists, considering valid thought as efficient thought, and denying the possibility of distinguishing the form from the content of thought. The movement toward restoration of continuity made in the name of "instrumental" or "experimental" logic, according to A. W. Moore, is not a despoliation of the character and rights of intelligence; but such a restoration alone aims to preserve the unique function of intelligence, to prevent it from becoming merely "existential," and to provide a distinct place for intellectual and scientific interest and activity; "it is precisely the experimental character of scientific logic that distinguishes it from scholasticism, medieval or modern."[2] In his "Formal Logic," Schiller attempts to expound the traditional logic of the idealists - namely formal logic - in its dependence on the fundamental assumption "that it is possible to study the formal truth of thought irrespective of its truth in point of fact, and to show that this fundamental abstraction everywhere leads to failure, failure both to account for the procedures of human thinking and failure to attain even formal consistency."[3] He scrutinizes symbolic logic used by the rationalists and mathematicians, and regards it as affiliated with formalism.[4] In

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1 Op. cit., pp. 86-87.
2 Dewey and Others, Creative Intelligence, pp. 77-88.
3 Schiller, Formal Logic, Preface, viii.
4 Ibid., p. 390ff.

demanding concessions of formal logic to what he calls "psychologic," Schiller asks the formal logician (1) "to give up his intolerant dogmatism and to admit that logic can be constructed on other assumptions than his own," (2) "to confine himself strictly within the limits he has marked out for himself.... ....," and (3) "to recognize that actual human thinking in science and ordinary life forms a real problem which urgently needs to be considered."[1] As for analytic logic, in the eyes of the pragmatists, its lack of continuity between the cognitive function of the nervous system and its other functions accounts for the strange paradox in the logic of new realism. It holds an act of knowing as conditioned by the act of a nervous system to be an objective affair. But, for the pragmatists, the subjectivity of this sort should be identified with the "psychical"; otherwise, the nervous system being once appealed to, there should be the physiological continuity of its functions with each other and with its environment.[2]

With idealism pragmatism is no less incompatible in the theory of knowledge than in any other field of methodology. We saw in the first chapter that, because Descartes's and Locke's epistemological dualism of idea and ideatum easily passed over into an ontological dualism of mind and matter, Berkeley supplanted their representative theory of perception with his presentative theory, and strove to demonstrate an ac-

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1 Schiller, Formal Logic, p. 392.
2 Dewey and Others, Creative Intelligence, p. 114f.

tual coherence between thing and idea. Now, the pragmatists rather tend to this theory of immediate presentation, but they hold fast to the "immediacy," and against intellectualism they elaborate their "immediatism." They first of all discriminate between immediate acquaintance with, or knowledge of a situation, and mediate familiarity with, or knowledge about the situation, and then they subordinate the latter to the former, considering mediate knowledge as serving immediate knowledge on which it is based. Accordingly, concepts are nothing but assistants of percepts.

Thus, in their way of interpreting knowledge, the pragmatists start from "belief," not from reason. Because in "pure and immediate" experience belief alone is not questioned; it is admitted as a patent matter of fact. Faith is the ground for the hypothesis of scientific method. Particularly it has been repeatedly emphasized by Schiller that emotional experience and faith are better means than purely logical process to the approach of realities. Since an idea is tested by how it works in the future, it owes "faith" its present validity. Therefore the action of an idea which produces its subsequent bearings is a measure of "belief."[1] Knowledge is merely the body of the best attested beliefs, and truth is a property attributed to these beliefs. As claimed by James, faith for pragmatism would remain a factor not to be banished from philosophic constructions, the more so since in many ways

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1 James, The Will to Believe, and Other Essays, pp. 29-30.

it brings forth its own verification.[1]

In contrast with the "correspondence theory" and the "coherence theory" of truth, the pragmatists have developed what may be called the "consistence theory" of truth. To be true an idea must be consistent with its works, with the previous ideas, and with the present needs of life. Thus, truth is not eternal, nor absolute, nor static; it is occasional, relative, and plastic. Utility, verifiability, and satisfactoriness are its main criteria. It happens to an idea, which becomes true and is made true by events. To be consistent with its works the idea must be "useful." For Dewey truth is not reality nor a thing but an abstract name applied to the collection of actual cases that receive confirmation in their works and consequences.[2] The hypothesis that works is true. Use is a measure of the truth of an idea. Schiller attempts to refute the correspondence theory of truth in his "Humanism,"[3] and holds that what is useful is true and the useless is false. The "eternal" truths are mere postulates. "A 'truth' is what is useful in building up a science; a 'falsehood' what is useless or noxious for this same purpose."[4] Absolute truth must be eternally incapable of correction, and only time can tell whether any such truth can be secured. Likewise, for James, truth is not an intrinsic or indefinable

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1 Ibid., p. 110.
2 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 156.
3 Schiller, Humanism, p. 146.
4 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 154.

quality of certain propositions, as it is for the intellectualists, but is something extrinsic or adventitious which adds itself to a fact of experience, and which consists in certain concrete relations supervening between this fact and the further course of experience. An idea is true so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives, and so long as it is satisfactory to our needs.[1] As regards this contention, Carus says that James seems to outdo Bentham's utilitarianism.[2] However, if truth is determined in the light of "usefulness," many lies which are useful must be true. The pragmatists do not make this point public, but James and Schiller openly endorse that theism is true to those who profit by their faith in God and atheism true to those who find it not profitable to believe in Him. Such a conception of "utility" as the only property which all true beliefs have in common cannot stand in the eyes of G. E. Moore, an outstanding spokesman of new realism.[3]

Royce thought James's pragmatic theory of truth unsatisfactory, because in most actual cases the practical consequences by which ideas are to be determined whether true or false cannot be had within our passing experience.[4] But A. W. Moore holds that the absolute idealists and the pragmatists, despite their quarrel about the problem of truth and error, are agreed

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1 James, Pragmatism, pp. 75, 76.
2 Carus, Truth on Trial, p. 6.
3 G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, p. 97ff.
4 Royce, Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 347.

in the conception of the "active," "constitutive" character of thinking, although most idealists consider this character as belonging only to the absolute thought.[1] Royce admitted this point of agreement between the two opposing systems, but from this character of thinking he argued for the post-Kantian idealists' conception of truth. Truth as synthesis of antithetical aspects never ignores but unifies oppositions. Such a conception of truth, according to Royce, is pragmatic, because, as the pragmatists at present relate truth to action, to practice, to the meaning or some active process accomplished, so do the post-Kantian idealists conceive of truth in terms of construction, process, activity, creation, attainment.[2] He daringly concluded that pragmatic movement was only a post-Kantian empirical idealistic movement.[3] "Truth meets truth;" says Royce, "truth is also true. Of these two propositions I conceive idealism to be constituted. If one attempts to define a world of merely relative truth, this world, as soon as you define it in its wholeness, becomes once more your absolute, your truth that is true."[4] But the pragmatist, in view of the consideration that rationalism, going from wholes to parts, always assumes wholes to be self-sufficing,[5] would never define anything by appealing to a whole.

The alternative between pragmatism and idealism has

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1 A. W. Moore, Pragmatism and Its Critics, p. 109.
2 Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism, pp. 85-86.
3 Ibid., p. 235.
4 Op. cit., p. 257.
5 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 123.

shifted from methodology to metaphysics. Reality for the idealists, particularly for the absolute idealists, is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for the pragmatists it is always in the making and is growing more complex by addition. A real world, as Mead says, consists "not of an unchanged universe, but of a universe which may be continually readjusted according to the problems arising in the consciousness of the individuals within society."[1] As to what reality is, pragmatism again resorts to radical empiricism. For idealism things are only and just what they are known to be; for pragmatism things are what they are experienced to be. In refuting dualism, James conceived of "pure experience" as the primal stuff in the world and as having no inner duplicity. There resides in the experience itself no dualism of being represented and representing; and in its pure state, there is no self-splitting into consciousness and what the consciousness is of. The subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes only, and the instant field of the present is the "pure experience."[2] Yet experience is neither thing nor thought; it is but a collective name for all the sensible natures in things, such as those of time, of space, of intensity, of flatness, of redness, of heaviness, and save for time and space (and, if you like, for 'being') there appears no universal element of which all things are made."[3] The discrimination of thought and thing

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1 Dewey and Others, Creative Intelligence, p. 223.
2 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 23.
3 Op. cit., p. 27.

is due to the fact that experience functions both inside and outside of the mind; hence, thoughts and things are made of the same stuff.[1] Thus, reality, as immediate, pure experience, emphasizes the content of experience, while experience in turn affirms the process of the reality. There is nothing beyond the realm of experience.

Nevertheless, experience is pluralistic, not monistic. Radical empiricism proves pluralism, as experience reveals no block-universe, no completely organized harmonious system, but multiplicity, diversity, opposition, heterogeneity. Renouvier's advocacy of pluralism and free-will freed James from the monistic superstitution and deterministic quietism as confessed by James himself.[2] For pluralism reality exists distributively. For Schiller all immediate experience is real and no ultimate reality can be reached except from this basis and upon the stimulation of immediate experience. The distinction between appearance and reality does not constitute a relation between our world and another, nor does it lead us to the affirmation of the absolute as Bradley supposed it to do.[3] Schiller is opposed to every form of 'a priori metaphysical criticism' which condemns the results of our experience as an illusory appearance. The absolute simplifies nothing and complicates everything, reducing concreteness to the illusory adumbration of a phantom whole. The idealists mostly seek to preserve the

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1 Ibid., p. 37.
2 James, The Will to Believe, and Other Essays, p. 143; Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 184-85.
3 Schiller, Humanism, p. 184ff.

verbal statement of the primary fact of idealism by saying that though all things exist in consciousness, it is in a divine consciousness that they can infer their mutual existence, but by making such a statement they cannot extricate idealism from the embarrassment of illusory concepts.[1]

The pragmatists are unanimously opposed to all monistic systems, and at the expense of monism they argue for pluralism. Pluralism, by assuming the ultimacy of plurality, avoids the difficulty fatal to monism, that is, it does not need to explain away the appearance of plurality in the world experienced. The one is nothing without the many; the many presuppose the one. Monism, resting on the real foot of plurality, is a parasitic theory dependent on pluralism for its further development, whereas pluralism can assert unity in a higher sense, which no monism can reach. A real union which pluralism holds to be achieved is that the many not only interact but also act together; and that their perfect and harmonious interaction would realize the ideal of a true union, and of a real unitedness.[2] The assumption of an absolute being is a production of the rationalistic temper, according to James. Yet, so far as it affords religious comfort to a class of minds, James never says that it is sterile but he admits that "it has that amount of value."[3] At any rate, the monistic hypothesis or the theory of the absolute is particularly com-

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1 Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx, pp. 260, 261.
2 Ibid., p. 346.
3 James, Pragmatism, p. 73.

pelled to be an article of faith, affirmed dogmatically and exclusively. But pluralism has no need of this dogmatic rigoristic temper.

However, like the idealists, the pragmatists hold a teleological view of the world, and argue for it from evolutionism which they have taken into their methodology.[1] Causation for the pragmatists is a matter of evolution. It is teleological since cause is instrumental to effect. "Free-will," says James, "practically means novelties in the world, the right to expect that in its deepest elements as well as in its surface phenomena, the future may not identically repeat and imitate the past."[2] Regarding the problem of evil, the sole question for him is not why evil should exist at all, but how the actual amount of it can be lessened by our effort.[3] Thus the melioristic assertion of pragmatism holds free-will to be a general cosmic theory of promise or a doctrine of relief, presupposing that things may become better. As regards God, the pragmatic conception is "radically" empirical. God is not absolute but finite; He is discovered, experienced, and used. All the absolutistic attributes the rationalists have offered to our conception of God are condemned by James as merely constituting an absolutely worthless invention of the scholastic mind.[4] The pragmatic theism is thus very intimately connected

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1 Schiller, Humanism, p. 155.
2 James, Pragmatism, pp. 118-19.
3 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 124.
4 James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 447.

with J. S. Mill's empirical theism.

So much for the pragmatic opposition to the idealist methodology and metaphysics. It is clear that in pragmatism ontology is conditioned by epistemology as much as it is in idealism. Schiller affirms indebtedness to Kant for his connection of ontology with epistemology. Standing on the "right" wing of pragmatism, Schiller is idealistic in comparison with other pragmatists. Regarding the contention that humanism is subjectivistic, James had to admit its subjectivity to the extent, that some of the realities the humanist declared for true were created by his being there, and that, unlike the rationalists who assumed the guaranty of the absolute truth of their present beliefs, the humanist holds them to be subject to revision in the light of future experience.[1] However, it admits of no doubt that the pragmatists in methodology adopt "empiricism" and in ontology elaborate "empiricism," or the theory of a world of "pure experience." The same correlation between epistemology and ontology exists in idealism; and, because of this, contemporary realism is equally incompatible with idealism and pragmatism. On the other hand, Bradley, in excess of loyalty to the "Hegelian dynasty," never willingly concedes such a world of "pure experience" to the pragmatists, contending that, since James, considering reality as one stream of immediate experience, left incompletely solved the question "what is experience" which he ought to have considered more

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1 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 251.

seriously, his metaphysics is utterly insignificant in the history of thought.[1]

The Hegelians in the English-speaking countries insist on the complete reality of the total unity of thought in the absolute mind and maintain the partial unity of the thoughts of individual minds. In reaction to the Hegelians as well as to the pragmatists, as we may say, the neo-idealists in Italy under the leadership of Benedetto Croce (1866-) and G. Gentile (1875-) advocate the abandonment of the static absolute, and concentration on the multiplicity and immediacy of experience in the individual mind. For them, mind, being active, self-creative, and self-creating, is literally the only thing in the world; besides mind there is no such all generative absolute. The universe actually is and exists as an unrolling of events; its ultimate reality is a perpetual becoming, whose completion, they hold, would be self-contradictory.[2]

Some of the present-day idealists in Germany, headed by Wilhelm Windelband (1848-) and Rudolf Eucken (1846-), have emphasized practice rather than theory. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who held to knowledge, to power, and to force, was not an idealist nor a pragmatist. But his adherence to individualism and his gospel of the ideal of the over-man in contrast with the Philistine in the latter half of the nineteenth century revealed a "pragmatic" reaction to the traditional

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1 Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 149-58.
2 Joad, Introduction to Modern Philosophy, p. 43.

philosophy. The idealistic Eucken, however, has elaborated a philosophy of life, treating of the sources of man's strength, and of the meaning and purpose of his spiritual endeavor. His attitude is anti-intellectualistic: he rests less upon subtleties of argument and more upon the enthusiasm which he can impart for his convictions. His main purpose is not to develop a new category, but to foster a new culture - to bring a religious inspiration to bear upon the problems of the world of human labor.[1]

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1 Gibson, Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life, pp. 10-11.

Chapter IV

REALISM VERSUS IDEALISM

The rivalry between realism and idealism must go back to the opening of the modern era if we consider the rationalistic idealism of Descartes as a direct reaction against the scholastic realism of the medieval period. The Platonic realists, best represented by St. Anselm, and the Aristotelian realists, led by Thomas Aquinas, who were all agreed that "universals" as realities exist independently of "particular" things, were combatted by John Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) and William of Occam (c. 1280-1347), the best known spokesmen of nominalism, who conceived of "universals" as mere names for particular things, not prior to them, nor in them, but after them. Nevertheless, both the Thomists and Scotists stood for naively realistic authoritarianism and unanimously advocated the complete union of reason and faith. The constant warfare between these two schools only hastened the downfall of scholasticism, as their common inadequacy and inconsistency exposed by their own quarrels intensified the antagonism of modern thinkers.

Modern realism[1], however, fundamentally differs from medieval realism. It is a realism of "individuals," insisting

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1 Under "modern realism" I include common sense realism, new realism, and critical realism.

on the objective existence of an outer world of individual things beyond the knowing subject. The primary object modern realists have in common is the refutation of idealism. Though they never mean in any sense to avenge medieval realists, their points of agreement are mainly based on a common hostility to idealism. In opposition to the sceptical idealism or pan-phenomenalism of Hume, Thomas Reid (1710-1796) propounded common sense realism among Scottish thinkers. He criticized Hume via Locke and Berkeley. As we have seen, Locke in his theory of knowledge started with three terms, namely, mind, idea, and matter or thing; Berkeley disproved matter and retained mind and idea; while Hume disproved both matter and mind. As for Reid, he maintained the possibility of direct intercourse between mind and matter, and by so doing he began with principles guaranteed by common sense.

For more than a hundred years Reid's realism was influential both abroad and at home. In order to combat the sensationalism of Condillac (1715-1780), who had imported British empiricism onto French soil, Royer-Collard (1763-1845) introduced Reid to the current French thinkers, and Jouffroy (1796-1742) translated Reid's works into French. In Scotland, Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) accepted Reid's teachings in opposition to the materialism of the first associationists, such as David Hartley, Joseph Priestly, and Erasmus Darwin, and together with Thomas Brown (1778-1820) he contributed a great deal to the popularization though not much to the advancement

of the Scottish philosophy of common sense. The greatest common sense philosopher and logician in the nineteenth century was Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856), who, in condemning Kant's transcendentalism and Hegel's intellectualism, proclaimed "to know is to condition" - a doctrine of relativity against absolutism. Common sense realism was transported to America as an anti-idealistic weapon first by John Witherspoon (1723-1794), a contemporary of Reid, and later by James McCosh (1811-1894), a pupil of Hamilton.

In continental Europe there appeared in opposition to the Hegelians certain realists, who were in fact precursors of the present-day new realism. J. F. Herbart (1776-1841) confronted Hegel's monistic idealism with his pluralistic realism. Ernst Mach's view set forth in his "Analysis of Sensations" that the sensible elements of the physical and the psychical are the same is numbered by R. B. Perry, a new realist, among the classics of new realism, though Mach neglected the logical analysis of those elements into certain more fundamental relationships.[1] Likewise, Richard Avenarius (1843-1896) has exercised considerable influence among many American realists, such as Perry, E. B. Holt, and especially W. T. Bush.[2] The Austrian psychologist Franz Brentano (1838-1917), who held psychic activity to be directed primarily upon outward objects and only secondarily, in retrospect,

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1 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 310.
2 Kremer, Le Neo-Realisme Americain, p. 284ff.

upon itself, led his student Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) to the formulation of the realistic "theory of objects" and "theory of value." Edmund Husserl (1859-), like Meinong, inspired by Brentano, holds that consciousness, which consists of acts and objects, may be regarded as lying between the ego and the object. Whether Husserl be a realist or idealist, the minute analysis of the cognitive process made by him contains many suggestions for the contemporary realists.[1] Both Meinong and Husserl have been greeted by Bertrand Russell and C. D. Broad in England. O. Külpe's (1862-1915) insistence on the transcendence of the object of knowledge must have contributed to the theory of immanence held by the new realists.[2] Another important realistic philosopher in the continent is Harald Höffding (1843-), a Danish thinker, who under the influence of Sören Kierkegaard (1813-1855), the most inspiring Scandinavian philosopher of the nineteenth century, has elaborated his realistic view that thought as a mere part of reality enables us to adapt ourselves to reality but cannot be proved to be typical of it.[3] In England the pioneering neo-realistic protest against the cardinal principles of modern idealism was inaugurated by Thomas Case in his "Physical Realism" first published in 1888. The work was designed, Case

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1 Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past, p. 210.
2 The theory of immanence is advocated particularly by R. B. Perry, who identifies it with the presentative theory of perception or epistemological monism that a known thing itself directly enters into a relation which forms the idea or content of a mind.
3 Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past, p. 206ff.

says, "to combat psychological idealism by means of physical realism, and to appeal from the hypothesis of psychical data to the physical objects of science."[1] It reveals that, the "new" realism Case preached, unlike common sense realism, resorts to the achievements of science systematically, and yet it is not any new form of naturalism but a new born philosophical system which profits by naturalism in its methodology.

In spite of its failure in metaphysics, the methodological value of naturalism cannot be under-estimated. The revival of scholasticism has revealed the effort on the part of the neo-Thomists to harmonize the trends of medieval thought with the achievements of science and to modernize the official philosophy of the Catholic Church by keeping themselves abreast with modern scientific progress, while not precisely departing from the attitude of the medieval thinkers. Contemporary realism[2] and naturalism are doubtless agreed that the accredited results of science are trustworthy and that physical nature exists independently of human knowledge. By the aid of the mathematical sciences, contemporary realists have striven to prove the priority of the logical procedure. Under the leadership of Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead, many contemporary realists, in whose eyes logic and mathematics merge into one technique of intellectual analysis, have elaborated and applied

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1 Case, Physical Realism, p. 14.
2 By "contemporary realism" I mean both the new realism and critical realism together.

the resultant "mathematical" or "symbolic" logic. Similarly, to refute the idealistic assertion of the priority of the cognitive process, they rely upon the biological sciences. Man is but a complicated and highly developed form in comparison with other organisms. Mind, as Holt says, is the nervous response which selects and defines the content of consciousness; psychology is primarily the science of response, and so is bound to be largely physiological.[1] The conception of mind as behavioristic action - constituted by interest and the nervous system - and mental contents, is very common among the realists. To inquire into the mental content and function, Perry adopts the method of introspection, and in investigating the contents of other minds the method of observation.[2] The realistic affirmation of the practical and empirical character of the knowledge process, and the biological theory of consciousness, reflect the legacy of William James, master of two realistic scholars at Harvard, namely, Perry and Montague. Nevertheless, behaviorism has exercised considerable influence on the realists, too. C. A. Strong's interpretation that in immediate experience physical movement or the tendency thereto is a factor in the cognitive process,[3] and George Santayana's adherence to "animal faith," are equally behavioristic. Thus, for all the contemporary realists

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1 Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, p. 338.
2 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 275ff.
3 Strong, A Theory of Knowledge, p. 24.

philosophy is and ought to be a science in method, and it differs from science in the nature of the subjects which it deals with. Faithfulness to science is certainly one of the basic factors around which contemporary realism has developed.

Another basic factor is the preference for deductive reasoning, in which both realism and idealism are agreed. But they differ as to its technical process: realism advocates the necessity of analysis, while idealism stands for the validity of synthesis. There are simple mathematical judgments in which we can know, according to Russell, the general proposition without inferring it from instances, so that deduction is as useful as induction.[1] Russell even chooses to consider deduction as master and induction as servant, when he says that the introduction of the inductive method resulted merely in the widening of the scope of deduction by pointing out a new way of deducing and that in the final form of a perfected science everything ought to be deductive.[2] Owing to their discovery of certain a priori logical constants, the realists claim the possibility of logical analysis of everything into simple elements and consider the true function of logic as analytic rather than synthetic. Analysis is described by the new realists as "only the careful, systematic, and exhaustive examination of any topic of discourse."[3] The

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1 Russell, Problems of Philosophy, p. 123.
2 Russell, Scientific Method in Philosophy, p. 34.
3 Holt and Others, The New Realism, p. 24.

various types of analysis are enumerated and its validity is defended by E. G. Spaulding in "The New Realism," a cooperative work of six American new realists.

Contemporary realism is fundamentally opposed to the confusion of metaphysics with epistemology, with which modern idealism has been charged. The history of modern idealism marks a gradual subjectivistic encroachment on the objective world - an absorption ending in complete subjectivity as in the solipsisms of the absolutists. The idealistic assertion of the priority of the cognitive process affirms the identification of the laws of reality with those of logic, which eventually ascribes a priori importance to epistemology. Hence, the dependence of being upon the knowing of it, and the dependence of ontology upon epistemology. The primary object of realism is to emancipate metaphysics from epistemology. In order to accomplish this, realism first as a doctrine of revolt has endeavored to demolish the cardinal principles of modern idealism, and next as a theory of reform it has advanced several famous arguments for its own cardinal principles - the assertion of the priority of the logical procedure and that of the independence of being upon the knowing of it. The conventional technique of contemporary realists is to refute idealism first, and then establish their own principles; and by so doing they emancipate the subjectified world, step by step, to its original state of objectivity. The objectivistic emancipation of the subjectified world is

the most important feature of the establishment of contemporary realism. The basic factors of realism thus stand out clearly revealed against those of idealism - faithfulness to science against loyalty to religion, preference for analytic deduction against that for synthetic deduction, and finally objectivistic emancipation of the subjectified world against subjectivistic encroachment on the objective world.

The fundamental issue between realism and idealism arises from the "ego-centric predicament," the difficulty or impossibility of conceiving known things to exist independently of any knowing subject, upon which Berkeley's dictum "esse est percipi" is based. According to the realists, the subsequent idealists merely restate this dictum and by so doing they multiply the number of difficulties involved in it. Realism and idealism are agreed: No objects, no mind. But realism proceeds to the refutation of the added proposition: No mind, no objects. Realism first accuses idealism of basing a false conclusion on a true proposition. The inference that, because a given thing is seen, its being seen constitutes its existence or is its essential and exclusive status, is an error. "To say of a physical object that it existed at a given time," says G. E. Moore, "will always consist merely in saying of some sensible, not that it existed at the time in question, but something quite different and quite immensely complicated."[1] To conceive a particular term of any

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1 Moore, Philosophical Studies, p. 191.

system as belonging to such system exclusively is due to the fallacy of "exclusive particularity." "Esse" is one thing, "percipi" is another; "esse" may be "percipi" occasionally but not exclusively. Owing to the fallacy, "esse" is held to be mental since "percipi" is mental. The necessary connection of "esse" with "percipi" is on the other hand due to the fallacy of pseudo-simplicity. Without having been logically analyzed, the simplicity of a concept cannot be asserted. Spaulding by an analysis in situ claims to emancipate "esse" from "percipi" and shows in "The New Rationalism" how epistemological, ontological, cosmological, theological, and psychological elements are intermingled in Berkeley's pseudo-simple axiom.[1] According to Moore, the idealists' necessary connection of the two terms is caused by their failure to distinguish the one from the other.[2] "Esse" and "percipi" are never synonyms. He condemns the idealistic assertion as utterly unfounded, because what is experienced cannot be identified with the experience of it. The idealists' use of the word "idea" is confusing when they hold that an idea cannot exist apart from a mind. Obviously they consider the idea as the external thing itself. The idea must be analyzed into distinct elements, namely, experience and content; because each sense-perception can be analyzed into the fact that there is experience and what is experienced. Again, the idealists say: 'Being' is mental;

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1 Spaulding, The New Rationalism, p. 238.
2 Op. cit., p. 13.

therefore 'reality' is mental. Such a conclusion is due to an implied major premise: 'Being' is 'reality'. Then 'being' may be mental, but 'reality' is not necessarily mental. The inverse is not always true. The syllogism is a fallacious conversion. Traditionally, modern idealists have been loyal to theism and so have willingly undertaken the championship of spiritualism. Whenever they cannot logically prove the spirituality of reality, they acquiesce in such a definition by initial predication. But, in order to affirm their fallacious conclusion, they look to the self-creative spirit, which confers upon man the priority of consciousness, or prescribes the constitution of the universe. From this speculative dogma there follow the error of verbal suggestion, the use of equivocal words and fictitious concepts, and the fallacy of illicit importance. All these logical fallacies are found in absolute idealism.

Hume, though he explained away the substantiality of the mind, did not attempt to prove the complete independence of the impressions of the mind, nor did he explain how one bundle of sense-impressions could know in any way another equally real bundle of sense-impressions. He merely made meaningless the conception of perceived objects subjectified as mental states. In the hands of Kant, who identified logic with the cognitive process, space and time were subjectified, then twelve categories or logical constants, and finally the laws of nature were considered as prescribed by the understanding. Accordingly, by criticizing Kant's assertions, contem-

porary realists attempt to emancipate space and time, the logical entities, and the laws of nature.

The objective reality of space and time has been repeatedly affirmed by the realists. They are not mere forms of our sensibility, but conditions of things and their motions beyond the range of our sensibility.[1] Kant's assertion that mathematical reasonings always use intuitions, namely, the a priori knowledge of time and space, according to Russell, is now capable of a final and irrevocable refutation. "By the help of ten principles of deduction and ten other premises of a general logical nature (e.g. 'implication is a relation')," says Russell, "all mathematics can be strictly and formally deduced; and all the entities that occur in mathematics can be defined in terms of those that occur in the above twenty premises."[2] Nowadays, for all algebra and analysis, we need not assume any material beyond the integers definable in logical terms. It is this science that is fatal to the Kantian theory of a priori intuitions - time and space - as the basis of mathematics.[3] Kant and his followers have argued against the apparent facts - infinite extent and infinite divisibility- ascribed to space and time on the ground of the supposed impossibility of an infinite collection. But the later mathematicians, notably Georg Cantor, have succeeded in demonstrating that the supposed impossibility of infinite collections

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1 Case, Physical Realism, p. 6.
2 Russell, Principles of Mathematics, p. 4.
3 Ibid., p. 158.

was a mistake, and in using logic to show the possibility of a space and time more or less different from those in which we live.[1]

Among all the contemporary realists S. Alexander has considered the problem of space and time most seriously. In contrast with the relational doctrine that space and time consist of relations between things or entities, and that they are respectively the order of coexistence and of succession of entities, Alexander advocates the view that Space and Time[2] are not merely the order of co-existence or succession of things, but are the ultimate stuff out of which things or events are made. Under this theory, the finites - things and events - are complexes of extension and duration. Space and Time possess continuity and infinity as crude, original characters which are presented and apprehended in experience.[3] Both Space and Time for Alexander are absolutely interdependent. Since both are infinite continua - the former of innumerable points and the latter of innumerable instants,- and the one cannot be conceived aside from the other, there can be no spatial point without a temporal instant, and no temporal instant without a position in space. A point occurs at an instant which in turn occupies a point. Hence, the conception of the whole Space-Time as an infinite continuum of pure events or point-instants.

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1 Russell, Problems of Philosophy, pp. 229, 230.
2 Alexander uses capital letters for Space and Time in general or as wholes, and small letters for any portion of them.
3 Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, Vol. I, pp. 39-43.

Total Space-Time is the synthesis of all perspectives or points of view, by which the apprehensible world is constituted. What is true of the world is true of the mind, which is not anything a priori but the experienced continuum of mental acts in terms of Space-Time. The fundamental properties of Space-Time are described as categories, which are pervasive and prerogative in all existents whatever, and which are in fact the essential and universal constituents of whatever is experienced. They are a priori and non-empirical in contrast with the empirical qualities, both primary and secondary, which can be apprehended in compresence with the mind owing to their dependence upon those a priori features of Space-Time. Alexander sympathizes with Kant for the latter's assertion that the categories, though contributed by mind, are veritable elements in objective knowledge. Yet he constantly reproaches Kant for the sharp distinction drawn between Space-Time and the categories, and considers the air of artificiality and unresolved miracle in Kant's analysis as due to the unfortunate separation of Space and Time from the categories.[1] Finally, Alexander openly declares that Space-Time takes the place of the absolute in idealistic systems, and that all finites, though absorbed into the one, still conserve their relative reality.[2] The world as the infinite becoming has no beginning nor ending. It is Space-Time which is all existence.

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1 Op. cit., pp. 190-92.
2 Ibid., p. 346.

But Space-Time is not the substance of substances, but the stuff of substances, of things, of existents. Evidently Alexander holds to a metaphysic of what we may call spatio-temporal monism.

The realists have not paid much attention to the criticism of Hegel. Only the dialectic method of reasoning has been directly attacked. It is criticised by Russell in his "Mysticism and Logic" as the appplication of an irrational mysticism; and Alexander maintains that Hegel's Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis are not categories at all, since they are not a priori constants of all existences, but are rather the concepts of the various phases of natural existence - e.g. "mechanism" and "chemism" and "life."[1] It seems inevitable to most of the realists that if they succeed in their campaign against Berkeley and Kant, Hegel cannot hold without support from his two predecessors. What they have dealt with as regards Hegel is mainly a criticism of a pupil through his masters, while ignoring the fact that Hegel in many aspects surpassed preceding thinkers. Formalism, equivocation, dogmatism, and solipsism, with which absolutists have been charged, are considered by the realists, such as Perry and Montague, to be mainly due to the absurdity and inevitability of the logical climax of subjectivism.

So much for the consideration of realism as a doctrine of revolt against idealism. It is not less necessary to investi-

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1 Ibid., p. 205f.

gate on the other hand how and why contemporary realism claims to be a theory of reform. In order to emancipate metaphysics, the realists have attempted to show that the cognitive consciousness is not a priori. For the realists, epistemology is not the fundamental science that the idealists have supposed it to be. It is one of the special sciences, such as physics and biology. As an inquiry into the relation between knowing and the something known, epistemology studies knowledge as a natural event just like biology studies life or phsyics electricity. In philosophy, to use Alexander's language, it forms a mere chapter among all different branches. The nature of things cannot be sought in the nature of knowledge, because epistemology is even posterior to other basic sciences, such as psychology, biology, logic, etc. The metaphysics of Locke, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel were supported by their various epistemological proofs, whereas Santayana for his realism has advanced three proofs - the biological, the psychological, and the logical - instead of appealing to epistemology.[1] If the cognitive consciousness is not prior to outward things perceived, the being of those things does not and need not depend upon the perceiving or knowing of them by the mind. Contemporary realism as a theory of reform has formulated its theory of independence - non-dependence of being upon the knowing of it, - for which there have been advanced five important arguments especially worth considering.

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1 Drake and Others, Essays in Critical Realism, p. 163ff.

First of all, contemporary realists all adhere to the priority of certain logical constants or categories, which are existents independent of the understanding, and with which the realists have replaced those of Kant. Categories as logical constants are indefinable, and independent of one another and of experience. They are of one stuff, neither mental nor physical. The comparatively concrete and particular categories or entities are described by Holt as more complex, and the abstract ones as more simple and fundamental.[1] C. D. Broad has undertaken to prove in his "Scientific Thought" that the recognition of the existence of certain logical entities is not naively realistic in any sense.[2] Most philosophers, according to him, have to admit the existence of such entities. Even in Berkeley's theory, there is involved the existence of certain entities, namely, the volitions or sensations of God, which are independent of the finite and are neutral as between two finite minds. Meinong, who first introduced into philosophy the term "objective" in dealing with the extramental existents, including both primary and secondary qualities, has exercised much influence upon T. P. Nunn and Russell with respect to the problem of logical constants. In his "Principles of Mathematics" Russell attempts to prove that all pure mathematics deals exclusively with concepts definable only in a few fundamental logical concepts, and its propositions can be

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1 Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, p. 160.
2 Broad, Scientific Thought, p. 232.

deduced from a few fundamental logical principles. The indefinables, according to Russell, are attained primarily as the necessary residue in a process of analysis. For this Russell acknowledges his indebtedness to G. E. Moore. "I have accepted from him," says Russell, "the non-existential nature of propositions (except such as happen to assert existence) and their independence of any knowing mind; also the pluralism which regards the world, both that of existents and that of entities, as composed of an infinite number of mutually independent entities, with relations which are ultimate, and not reducible to adjectives of their terms or of the whole which these compose."[1] These doctrines, as he confesses, saved him many difficulties in formulating his philosophy of mathematics and especially his logical atomism. The world is made up by these logical atoms or entities, which are neither physical nor mental, but which permeate both matter and mind.[2] As things are complexes of Space-Time, says Alexander, the logical categories enter into the mind, which is only a highly developed spatio-temporal complex, as well as into the constitution of everything else.[3] The logic of the realists, particularly the new realists, is not any logic of thought, but the logic of existence. Holding that logic and mathematics ought to merge into one, they claim to discover mathematical axioms or truths and logical categories or self-evident concepts, and

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1 Russell, Principles of Mathematics, p. viii.
2 Russell, The Analysis of Mind, p. 36.
3 Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, Vol. I, p. 330.

assert that their discovery of those indefinable constants can never affect the latter in any way. Naturally their positivistic ontology is constructed upon the ground of the priority of the logical procedure. Metaphysics is described by W. T. Marvin as the study of the logical foundations of science and the theory of reality.[1] The business of metaphysics, according to Alexander, is "to describe the fundamental or a priori characters of things if there are such, and the relations between them."[2] The cosmology of the realists is on the whole evolutionistic owing to their interest in biology and physiological psychology. Alexander seemingly tends toward a volitional conception of immortality, namely, in terms of our desire for a future life, and yet he holds that, since immortality cannot be demonstrated experimentally, we have to acquiesce in what we know and to scrutinize the evidence presented to us, and not rather to accept our view in accordance with a wish.[3] Durant Drake has advanced one step further in disposing of the problem. "Even if there is evidence of the existence of an immaterial Soul interacting with the brain-process," he says, that evidence does not point to the immortality of such an Immaterial Entity."[4] Freedom the realists do not interpret in terms of indeterminism. In the valuable sense it is the demand that our volitions be the result of our own desires,

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1 Holt and Others, The New Realism, p. 45.
2 Alexander, The Basis of Realism, p. 4.
3 Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, Vol. II, pp. 423-24.
4 Drake, Mind and Its Place in Nature, p. 244.

not of an outside force compelling us to will what we would rather not.[1] Such a demand, however, is directly concerned with mechanical causation which is not indeterminism but in fact determinism. Therefore, Russell has come to conclude that the problem of free will versus determinism is mainly illusory, and in part not yet capable of being decisively solved.[2] Quite similarly, Alexander conceives of freedom as "the form which causal action assumes when both cause and effect are enjoyed," namely, as determination enjoyed, or in enjoyment, and human freedom as "a case of something universal which is found wherever the distinction of enjoyment and contemplation,[3] in the widest sense of those terms, is found."[4] Alexander's theism is the doctrine that God as the being which possesses deity as the divine quality, is the next higher empirical quality than mind or any other level of existence.[5] The metaphysics of the realists, though based on the priority of the logical procedure in the same way, differ from one another. Nevertheless, without difficulty we may conclude that they are in general pluralistic, positivistic, and evolutionistic.

The new realists, especially those who have won fame as mathematicians, have advanced an argument for their theory of independence on the ground of the validity of symbolic or

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1 Russell, Scientific Method in Philosophy, p. 236.
2 Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p. 208.
3 We shall see later how Alexander distinguishes between enjoyment and contemplation.
4 Alexander, op. cit., p. 315.
5 Ibid., pp. 241-45.

mathematical logic. First of all, symbolic logic testifies to the reality of the logical concepts, which analysis aims to reach ultimately. Furthermore, the reality of these basic entities involves the reality of space and time, as has been frequently noticed. Again, symbolic logic facilitates the method of deduction. Finally, it is employed by the realists to prove the externality of relations - the basis of the central argument for the theory of independence.

The most important argument for the theory of independence has been advanced from the externality of relations, because the fundamental issue between realism and idealism is whether relations are external or internal. The idealistic spokesman on the internality of relations was Bradley.[1] His axiom of internal relations holds that relations are parts or states of their terms. Every object is inevitably related to every other object in the universe. It would not be what it is unless it stood in all these relations to other objects. Hence, its relations do contribute to the nature and being of the object. Therefore, Bradley boldly declared that, as all things are interrelated, the nature of each forms part of the nature of all, and that accordingly their interrelationship reveals the existence of the absolute whole. It is the realistic Bertrand Russell who has been leading adventurous volunteers in attempting a dash at Bradley. They endeavor to support their argument for the externality of relations first by the analysis of simple

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1 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, chap. iii.

terms. All existents are in relation. Relations may be between ideas or mental acts but they are not created by the mind. Then, if all individual relations are external realities, no relation is a part of the term which it relates. In the proposition, "the term (a) is in the relation R to the term (b)," (a)R in no degree constitutes (b), nor does (b)R constitute (a), nor does R constitute either (a) or (b). The relations between terms are something external added to the terms.[1] They are new terms added to the original terms and so have existence as the original ones. Russell has developed another proof for the externality of relations from asymmetrical relations.[2] These relations are such as always preclude the identity of the inverse with the original relation. Thus, the word "is," for example, designates so many different varieties of "relation" in which one subject stands to its complements that it is impossible to identify the inverse with the original relation or to analogize the relation in one case to that in another or to symmetrize any varieties of relations with each other. The third and final proof is derived from the notions of the infinity and continuity of space and time. Inability to prove the external reality of space and time led to the conception of them as illusory, unreal, or subjective forms of cognition. The three problems of the infinitesimal, the infinite, and continuity, by which Zeno was puzzled in making

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1 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 319.
2 Russell, Principles of Mathematics, chap. xxvi.

Achilles overtake the tortoise, have been successfully solved, according to Russell - the first by Weierstrass, while the solution of the other two was begun by Dekekind and definitely accomplished by Cantor.[1]

The above mentioned three logical arguments are in fact inter-dependent. There are two more arguments - the biological and the psychological. These two are inter-dependent as regards each other, but support the logical arguments by disproving the priority of consciousness.

Biologically the realists argue from the adaptability of the human organism to its environment. For idealism, mind is the measure of things. Realism is to de-anthropomorphize: "to order man and mind to their proper place among the world of finite things; on the one hand to divest physical things of the colouring which they have received from the vanity or arrogance of mind; and on the other to assign them along with minds their measure of self-existence."[2] The supposition of mind as superior to physical things is entirely due to the self-flattering habit of the scholastic mind. All realists are agreed in the conception of the mind in terms of action and reaction to its environment. When the mind functions, it is always relative to its non-mental object. The mental act of that moment is the conscious response to some non-mental

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1 Russell, Mysticism and Logic, pp. 81-92.
2 Alexander, The Basis of Realism, p. 1.

existent which is its object.[1] "We human beings," affirms J. B. Pratt, "are so co-ordinated with the rest of nature that when our psycho-physical organisms are acting normally our percepts refer to and correspond with existent entities which are not part of our mental content."[2] The mind is the "brain-mind" or the receptive and reactive organ sensitive to stimuli, which are transmuted into presentations, whereby interests are aroused in the same brain-mind and focussed in the conscious self operating analytically and synthetically. The realists, with the exception of Russell, hold that any stimuli which arouse the brain-mind to activity are non-mental and so external. Russell declares in "The Analysis of Mind" himself to be a realist as regards sensation, but not as regards memory or thought;[3] for memory and thought, according to him, involve something essentially psychical. Like the pragmatists, the realists discriminate between mind and consciousness. The mind functions passively, but it functions actively when it exercises its selective response in a conscious activity to certain stimuli. The passivity and receptivity of the nature of the mind necessitate the existence of an environment which is constantly discharging stimuli towards the mind. The selective response of the conscious activity of the mind proves the preexistence and the independent existence of an environment. If there is to be any response, to use Perry's language,

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1 Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, Vol. II, p. 117.
2 Drake and Others, Essays in Critical Realism, p. 105.
3 Russell, The Analysis of Mind, p. 20ff.

there must be something to be responded to.[1] In order to be larger and logically more inclusive than what is selected by the conscious activity of the mind, the environment must have pre-existed and exist independently of the choosing mind. The mind simply employs consciousness as a medium and means for the transformation of the macrocosm into a correspondent microcosm.[2] The external objects owe to the mind their "percipi" by its selective activity, but not their "esse." The Berkeleyan idealists would hold that those objects owe to the perceiving mind their "esse," fundamentally because they mistake "selection" for "creation." There still remains one question as to what this mental activity is and whether it is external or internal. All the realists maintain it to be external. The a priori logical constants, as we have seen, permeate both mind and matter. Consciousness as a function of the living organism is, as Holt says, the sum total of all neutral entities to which the organism responds.[3] Mental activity of any sort is considered as objective; for it is due to the whole nervous system of the organism, which is constantly responsive to its environment.

Finally, the realists have advanced a psychological (still better, psycho-physical) argument for their theory of independence from the analysis of experience into distinct elements. Realism considers the element of process in conscious

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1 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 323.
2 Sellars, Evolutionary Naturalism, pp. 73ff.
3 Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, pp. 183-84.

behavior seriously, while idealism emphasizes the element of content. The sense data of all sorts for the idealists are psychical. But contemporary realists, unlike the common sense realists who hold that through intuition we directly perceive the external physical world, contend that all sense data, though internal, are not psychical, because they are physical parts of the nervous system. The ambiguity which Berkeley and Hume overlooked in investigating our cognitive process, says Santayana, lay in the relation of ideas to physical things.[1] Though both transcendentalism and absolutism hold that reality is independent of finite knowledge, yet they accept no "being" except that which is judged by the synthetic unity of apperception, namely, the transcendental ego, or that which is rationalised by the finite participants in the absolute mind. Reality for pragmatism is experience, though existing independently of thought and of mediate knowledge. The thorough going realists, condemning all these systems as "half-realisms," hold reality to be independent not only of thought, but of all experience whatever.[2] Heat, as a primary quality of fire, the idealist considers as something inside the mind. For the realist, the heat of which he is immediately aware is in his body, not in the fire, and it is only by logical inference, says Russell, that the fire is judged to be the cause of the heat felt in his body.[3] Thus, as regards the cognitive process,

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1 Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 68.
2 Perry, op. cit., p. 315.
3 Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p. 132.

Russell and all other "new" realists hold to what we may call "causal" presentationalism. But they differ as to the number of elements into which they analyze our experience of cognition and other sorts.

Meinong analyzes our experience into three elements - act of the mind, mental content of the act, and external object. The mental act remains the same in all cases of experience. As to the content of the act, Meinong holds the cat-content to be different from the dog-content. But the bare act of the mind considered as something divorced from its content is unthinkable, unnecessary, and useless. Therefore some other new realists analyze experience into two elements, namely, the mental awareness of an object and the object itself.

Using "sensation" and "idea" as synonyms, Moore analyzes a sensation into two elements: the elementary consciousness common to all sensations, that there exists an "awareness" of blue; and the consciousness that the "being aware of" has a unique relation to blue, an object.[1] The existence of this unique relation which this unique element "awareness" bears to blue justifies the distinction of the knowledge of a thing from the thing known, and also the distinction of mind from matter, according to Moore. No wonder, the existence of "blue" is one thing; the existence of "the sensation of blue" is another.

Alexander analyzes experience into two elements, too.

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1 Moore, Philosophical Studies, pp. 24ff.

Perception is regarded as a process in which mind "enjoys" itself in compresence with an object which it is "contemplating." That is to say, mind and its object, being two separate existences, are connected in one whole experience by the relation of "togetherness" or "compresence." Between the mental act and its object, the relation of "compresence" seems to be a third element. But Alexander says that the mind in enjoying itself enjoys its "compresence" with the object contemplated."[1] It contemplates the object but does not contemplate the object's compresence with itself. Thus, the seemingly third element is merged into the first one - the act of enjoyment which is held to be an intuitional fact. Apparently, the distinction between enjoyment (or "experiencing") and objects contemplated (or "experienced") is more fundamental, as Alexander himself says, than that between mental act and its object.[2] The relation of compresence remains the same while the objects contemplated differ. The compresence between mind and its object does not qualitatively differ from the compresence of one physical thing with another. Alexander uses the word "cognita" to include objects from all sources, and treats all of them - even the contents of memory, imagination, and judgements - as non-mental. Therefore, enjoyment may be immediate at the moment or supplemented by remembered or expected enjoyment, or mediately by inferred enjoyment, or

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1 Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, Vol. I, p. 21.
2 Alexander, The Basis of Realism, pp. 6,7.

by reflective synthesis of all these data. The distinction between enjoyment and objects contemplated naturally leads to the conclusion that there exist independently external things, to which the mind responds through its bodily organs, whereby enjoyments are initiated.

Russell, together with Nunn and the American new realists, banishes the act of cognition or mental act of any other sort, and retains only one element, namely, "mental event," while calling an experience a "mental occurrence."[1] These thinkers aim to dispose of the duality of subject and object in any mental occurrence. Being effects caused by non-mental things, mental events are events in a living brain which is a region combining sensitivity with the law of learned reactions to a marked extent.[2]

Despite their difference as to the number of terms into which they analyze our experience, all these realists, reenforcing the pragmatists and the Berkeleyan idealists, adhere to the presentative theory of sense-perception that recognized no veil betwixt mind and reality. Holt's saying,[3] "nothing can represent a thing but that thing itself," forms the basis of the realistic theory of immanence. The difference between mind and things is held to be a causal and functional difference, and not a difference of content. What the epistemological

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1 Russell in his The Problems of Philosophy still keeps mental act in distinguishing "sense-data" from "sensation."
2 Russell, Philosophy, pp. 280-81, 285.
3 Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, p. 142.

dualists maintain to be "representation," for these realists is an immanent relation. Their assertion of the independence of the immanent differentiates them from other epistemological monists. Therefore, as regards external things, the realistic theory of immanence recognizes two sorts of transcendence, according to Perry: first, a thing transcends the cognitive relation by virtue of its possession of an intrinsic quality of its own, or by virtue of its possession of other relations; second, it transcends its representation, within the field of cognition itself.[2] In epistemology an inquiry into the relation between the knowing mind and the thing known, attention is called to the distinction between immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge. In the case of the former sort of knowledge, the new realists conceive the thing perceived and the idea as identical, except as regards their relations; in the latter, the thing thought about and the thought, as experienced in one whole. Not that an idea in the mind is the representative of a thing, but that a thing is an idea by virtue of its relation to a nervous system. Unlike the pragmatists who conceive of mediate knowledge as instrumental to immediate knowledge, the new realists attach equal importance to both, and hold that mediate knowledge can extend our experience by inference and judgment. The American new realists conceive of truth in terms of identity with reality,[2] holding

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1 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 313.
2 Holt and Others, The New Realism, p. 252.

our knowledge of reality to be imperfect, and recognizing partial truth and partial error in our cognitions. Thus there are for them degrees of truth and falsity which are equally real in proportion to what is known of reality existing independently of the knowing mind and to what is unknown. Alexander interprets truth in terms of the coherence of the judgment implied by any proposition about reality.[1] For him, an illusion is a mistake of perception; an error, the oblique judgment of reality. Russell holds a new correspondence theory of truth. He considers every judgment as a relation of a mind to several objects, one of which is the relation between the original objects. In every true belief or judgment, there must be a "corresponding" complex, which consists of the two terms (e.g. a boy and a girl, whom the boy loves) related by the relation (i.e. "loves") in the same sense as that in which the judgment is made.[2] But for minds, there would be no truth nor falsehood. Yet truth and falsehood never depend upon the person making the given judgment, inasmuch as the corresponding complex does not contain the judge as a constituent except when the judgment happens to be about the judge himself. Thus Russell contends that this theory of truth preserves fully the mixture of dependence upon mind and independence of mind, which for him is a characteristic of truth.[3] Such a conception of truth, together with the use of judgment and belief as

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1 Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, Vol. II, p. 252.
2 Russell, Philosophical Essays, pp. 183-84.
3 Russell, op. cit., p. 184.

synonyms,[1] causes much difficulty to the neo-realistic solution of the problem of error and illusion.

As a theory of reform, contemporary realism has formulated few metaphysical systems, and, so, before the realists complete their campaign against the idealists, a counter-attack has been made by many leading spokesmen of contemporary idealism, such as Royce in "The World and the Individual," Bosanquet in "The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy," Hoernlé in his "Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics," Calkins in "The Persistent Problems of Philosophy," Sinclair in "A Defence of Idealism," and "The New Idealism," and McTaggart in "The Nature of Existence." The attention of the idealists, which has been called to the apparent difficulties involved in Berkeley's dictum, however, has never led to serious concessions to the critique of contemporary realism. The realists' assumption of the possible existence of unknown objects, according to Calkins, is due to the confusion of the unperceived - which may be described as possibly existing - with the unknown, which it is impossible to maintain to be physical or mental. If "not denying the existence of the unknown objects" cannot be identified with "asserting anything about them," there is even less justification in asserting than in denying the possible existence of those objects unknown.[2] Absolute idealism never believes "that things

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1 Russell, Philosophical Essays, p. 172; The Problems of Philosophy, p. 195.
2 Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 418.

exist as they appear, apart from the context of the system in which we find them, whether in its causal or in its apprehensive aspect"; while not holding that their esse is percipi, if percipi implies immediate presentation, idealism insists that reality, as the object of thought, is always mediate and transcendent of the immediate.[1] The direct experience with non-mental objects existing independently of the experiencing mind, which the new realists claim, in the eyes of the thorough-going idealist is nothing but a secondary, reflective consciousness of these objects - namely, the outcome of an effort to explain immediate consciousness. Yet both neo-realism and absolutism argue against the "neo-idealistic" reduction of all experience to thinking and against the conception of the external world as a creation of the thinking activity; this despite the agreement between neo-realism and neo-idealism in the acceptance of the ultimate reality of time and change, the conception of reality as "becoming," and an advocacy of meliorism as the only attitude towards the world and life - as regards moral struggle and religious enthusiasm.[2] Between critical realism and absolutism there are, according to Bosanquet, certain significant points of agreement: the consideration of things normally apprehended as mere "appearances" because of the destruction of their qualities by the separation from the context of percipients and of other things; the con-

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1 Bosanquet, The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 128.
2 Ibid., pp. 117ff., 127ff.

ception of knowledge as consisting in qualifying the existent "that" of the object of thought by the ideal or essence "what," namely, a meaning distinguished from the object.[1] But the critical realist's severance of truth and reality as opposed to the absolutist's adherence to their relative identity, Bosanquet says, is the point of divergence between the two systems.[2] The modified position of McTaggart is extraordinarily conspicuous. Emancipating metaphysics from epistemological bondage and making a free inquiry into the problem of reality, he claims to be an idealist in ontology on the ground that all that exists he believes to be spiritual; but he considers himself as a realist in epistemology, as knowledge for him is a true belief which is true only when it stands in a relation of correspondence to a fact. He conceives of reality as an indefinable quality, for which being is another name. Thus, "existence" for him is indefinable, too. That which is, being real, "existence" and "reality" are held to be equivalents or synonyms. No doubt, such identification cannot be permitted by the realists without qualification.

Epistemology being regarded as a mere chapter in the text of philosophy, contemporary realists in their anti-idealistic enterprise have been quarreling about the problem of knowledge. They have broken up into two mutually rival groups since the publication of the "Essays in Critical Realism" in 1920 by seven American "critical" realists, who have accused

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1 Ibid., pp. 129-34.
2 Op. cit., p. 137.

both idealists and new realists of common failure to solve the problem of error. The former treat error as a case of partial truth, while the latter grant objectivity to error and truth equally. Between the two factors in our experience - the psychical and the physical - the critical realists have introduced a third factor, namely, the datum, which they have termed an "essence," and which Santayana claims to have discovered at the extreme of scepticism. The fear of illusion causes the attitude of scepticism, and, according to Santayana, there are three ways in which that fear may be dispelled: first, death, in which illusion vanishes but no solution is offered to the previous doubt; second, correcting the error and substituting a new belief for it; and finally, entertaining the illusion without succumbing to it, "accepting it openly as an illusion, and forbidding it to claim any sort of being but that which it is; and then, whether it profits me or not," says Santayana, "it will not deceive me. What will remain of this non-deceptive illusion will then be a truth the being of which requires no explanation, since it is utterly impossible that it should have been otherwise."[1] What the entertained, non-deceptive illusion becomes is an "essence," which is no illusion now but an idea. The error that grew from a wild belief about it is now washed out of it. In this discovery, Santayana, as well as other critical realists, finds rest. The objective existence of things is apprehended

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1 Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, pp. 72-73.

through their essences either by inferential reasoning or by "animal faith," but not by immediate knowledge. With the new realists, the critical realists hold to the theory of independence, but they go back to the representationalism or epistemological dualism of Descartes and Locke, with which the new realists' theory of immanence is absolutely incompatible. They conceive of truth in terms of the correspondence between the sense data or essences and the characteristics of the thing referred to, and of error as disparity between an essence and its object. Drake, Rogers, Santayana, and Strong hold that essence is a mere logical entity but has no locus in the world of existence, and that it is referred to an existent because of our instinctive feelings and practical beliefs about it; whereas Lovejoy, Pratt, and Sellars maintain it to be an existent - the character of the mental state of the moment.[1] The new realists' account of our cognitive process, according to all these men, must be erroneous. This is so first because an object supposed to be immediately presented to one consciousness cannot be in two consciousnesses at once. Herein is involved the difficulty of the problem of perspective. Moreover, the sense-data which the mind perceives are the messages sent out by the physical objects, to which they refer, so that these messages cannot be the physical objects themselves. This is a direct challenge to the new realists' theory of immanence. Finally, it is urged that

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1 Evans, New Realism and Old Reality, p. 143.

different consciousnesses of the same object cannot have the same sense-perception, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Whether these main objections raised by the critical realists to the new realists are adequate or not, it cannot be disputed that the incompatibility between the two forms of contemporary realism is not less apparent than that between idealism and realism in general.

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